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1 Einleitung
Die staatliche Regulierung von Schusswaffen in Privatbesitz ist sowohl in der
wissenschaftlichen Literatur als auch in der Gesellschaft ein intensiv diskutiertes
Thema. Die Diskussion in der Öffentlichkeit wird nahezu ausschließlich auf Ba-
sis von Einzelbeobachtungen geführt. Interessenverbände und politische Parteien
dominieren diese Diskussion. Herausragende Interessenverbände in den Vereinig-
ten Staaten sind die National Rifle Association (NRA), die sich sehr erfolgreich
[24] für ein freizügiges Waffenrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten einsetzt, und
– mit entgegen gerichteter Zielsetzung – das auch global agierende Internatio-
nal Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). Eine in der Bedeutung mit der NRA
vergleichbare Organisation, die ähnliche Ziele verfolgt, existiert in Deutschland
nicht. Die Schießsport- und Jagdverbände sind hier die prominentesten Vertre-
ter eines “pro”-Schusswaffen Standpunktes. Auf der anderen Seite werden ins-
besondere von der Partei Die Grünen in den letzten Jahren Gesetzesvorschläge
unterbreitet (z.B. Bundestagsdrucksachen 17/2130 und 17/7732), die auf eine
strengere Regulierung von privaten Schusswaffen in Deutschland abzielen.
In der öffentlichen und politischen Debatte werden vor allem drei Begründun-
gen für Regulierung/Deregulierung von Schusswaffen angeführt. Dies sind zum
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einen “school shootings.” In Deutschland fanden zwei besonders aufsehenerre-
gende Taten 2002 in Erfurt und 2009 in Winnenden statt. Auf beide Ereignisse
wurde von der Politik mit strengerer Schusswaffenregulierung durch Änderun-
gen im deutschen Waffengesetz reagiert. In das Beratungsverfahren gingen auch
wissenschaftliche Positionen ein [2]. Das school shooting vom Dezember 2012 in
Newtown, Connecticut leitete in den USA eine intensive Diskussion um die dor-
tigen Waffengesetze ein. Auch hieran beteiligte sich die Wissenschaft [11]. Dass
die Tragik eines solchen Ereignisses von Interessenvertretern in ihrem Sinne aus-
genutzt wird, ist nicht auszuschließen. Ebenso ist nicht garantiert, dass alle von
Wissenschaftlern geäußerten Positionen neutral sind.
Des Weiteren wird in der Diskussion eine abstrakte allgemein erhöhte Gefähr-
dung durch die Verbreitung von Schusswaffen angenommen, was sich in Deutsch-
land auch in der Rechtsprechung (BVerwG 1 C 5.99) niederschlägt.
Ein dritter Diskussionspunkt sind Suizide. Sollte die Verfügbarkeit von Schuss-
waffen die Neigung einzelner sich selbst zu töten erhöhen, so ist es naheliegend,
über Vermeidungsmöglichkeiten nachzudenken. Dass alle drei Punkte ökonomi-
sche Dimensionen besitzen, ist offensichtlich. Ebenso sind ökonomische Auswir-
kungen durch Regulierung/Deregulierung zu erwarten – und zwar abhängig so-
wohl von der Richtung und Größe eines eventuell bestehenden Zusammenhangs
als auch vom direkten Effekt durch die Regulierung auf Markt und Komplemen-
tärmärkte für Schusswaffen sowie eventuellen individuellen Nutzen.
In der Wissenschaft wird – vermehrt seit [19], z.B. in [7], [4] und als aktuel-
len Beispielen [8], [16] und [15] – auch in der volkswirtschaftlichen Literatur mit
quantitativen Methoden nach möglichen Zusammenhängen zwischen Schusswaf-
fen und Devianz gesucht. Gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen unerwünsch-
tem deviantem Verhalten und Schusswaffen, so ist – abhängig von der Richtung
dieses Zusammenhanges – plausibel, dass die Verbreitung von Schusswaffen in
der Bevölkerung sich auf diesem Wege positiv [3, 19, 18] oder negativ [4, 7] auf
das Gemeinwohl auswirkt. Die Hypothese, dass die Verfügbarkeit von Schuss-
waffen mit school shootings zusammenhängt, ist in der qualitativen Literatur zu
diesen Ereignissen verbreitet. Folgt man der Bezeichnung “school shooting”, so
ist auf den ersten Blick ein perfekter Zusammenhang zu vermuten. Nach der Defi-
nition des Begriffs in [23] kann ein school shooting mit z.B. Hieb-, Stich-, Brand-
2
oder Sprengwaffen begangen werden. Derartige Fälle sind eingetreten, so dass
der vormals offensichtlich perfekte Zusammenhang nicht besteht.
Bei allen drei oben beschriebenen Verhaltensweisen – school shootings, sons-
tige Gewaltkriminalität, Suizid – handelt es sich um von der gesellschaftlichen
Norm abweichendes, also deviantes, Verhalten. Dieses soll – unter Berücksichti-
gung eventueller Trade-Offs – durch geeignete regulatorische Maßnahmen un-
terbunden werden. Aus wohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht ist es hierbei wünschens-
wert, nicht opportun einer beliebigen Seite der Debatte stattzugeben. Vielmehr
sollte eine Regulierung auf quantitativer Evidenz basieren. Solche ist, entgegen
vielen qualitativen Ergebnissen, nicht durch einen persönlichen Bias beeinfluss-
bar. Die wissenschaftliche Debatte zu dem Thema “Schusswaffen und Devianz”
ist nicht abgeschlossen. Meine Arbeit trägt hierzu in drei Punkten bei: Zu school
shootings zeige ich qualitativen Forschern eine einfach anzuwendende und leicht
verständlicheMethode auf und demonstriere, dass diese unter plausiblen Parame-
tern zu aussagekräftigen Ergebnissen kommen kann. Zu Schusswaffen und Suizi-
den bestätige ich ein bekanntes Ergebnis: Mehr Schusswaffen hängen mit mehr
Schusswaffensuiziden zusammen. Gleichzeitig berichtige ich ein in der Regulie-
rungsdebatte verwendetes Ergebnis, das einen starken (Schein-)Zusammenhang
zwischen Schusswaffen und Suiziden insgesamt behauptet [9]. Zur Thematik
Schusswaffen undGefährdung der Bevölkerung zeige ich, dass eine Regulierungs-
empfehlung [4] auf einem Scheinresultat aus einer Regressionsrechnung basiert.
Hieraus ergibt sich gleichzeitig ein interessantes theoretisches Ergebnis zur mög-
lichen Verzerrung von Ergebnissen in Log-Raten-Modellen.
2 Shool Shootings  Extrem seltene Ereignisse
Es existiert umfassende qualitative Literatur zu school shootings, z.B. [20, 21, 17,
6]. Aus dieser ergibt sich eine Vielzahl von Hypothesen über mögliche Einfluss-
faktoren, die zur Entscheidung, eine derartige Tat zu begehen, beitragen könnten.
Ein solcher vermuteter Einflussfaktor ist die Verfügbarkeit von Schusswaffen. Ein
quantitativer Untersuchungsansatz existiert meines Wissens nicht. Eine Einzel-
meinung behauptet gar: “die seltenen Vorkommnisse verbieten ein quantitativ
orientiertes Vorgehen” [1, S. 38].
In [23] findet sich ein theoretisches Modell, das die Entscheidung, ein school
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shooting zu begehen, als latentes Variablenmodell beschreibt. Die unbeobachtete
Variable ist hierbei die “Fantasie” der Täter. Diese wird durch exogene Faktoren be-
einflusst und kann zur binären Tatentscheidung führen. Mit dieser Motivation un-
tersuche ich in [28] und aufbauend auf [13], ob eine quantitative Untersuchung
von school shootings mit Hilfe einer Fall-Kontroll Studie und logistischer Regres-
sion erfolgversprechend dafür wäre, signifikante Zusammenhänge zu erkennen.
Hierzu habe ich die Simulationssoftware [26] entwickelt und eine Simulationsstu-
die unter plausiblen Populationsparametern durchgeführt. Mein Ergebnis zeigt,
dass unter
(i) geeigneter Definition der Grundgesamtheit,
(ii) der weltweit vorliegenden Fallzahl und
(iii) ggf. unter Zusammenfassung einzelner Einflussfaktoren in geeigneten Grup-
pen
mit signifikanten Ergebnissen zu rechnen ist – falls es tatsächlich Faktoren gibt,
die mit einem erhöhten relativen Risiko, ein shool shooting zu begehen, zusam-
menhängen.
3 Suizid in Österreih und der FSS-Proxy
Aus zweierlei Motivation untersuche ich den Zusammenhang zwischen Suiziden
und Schusswaffen mit österreichischen Registerdaten. Zum einen halte ich es für
einen wichtigen Teil wissenschaftlicher Arbeit, bestehende Ergebnisse mit neu-
en Daten zu verifizieren. Zum anderen findet sich in [9] ein Ergebnis, das einen
überraschend starken Zusammenhang zwischen Schusswaffenlizenzen und Sui-
ziden aller Art für Österreich behauptet. In meiner Arbeit [27] zeige ich, dass
die Zusammenhänge in [9] weitestgehend Scheinzusammenhänge sind, da der
seit 1896 bekannte Effekt möglicher Scheinkorrelation zwischen Verhältnisvaria-
blen ignoriert wurde [12, 22]. Einzig ein Zusammenhang zwischen Schusswaf-
fenlizenzen und Schusswaffensuiziden lässt sich über diverse Modellspezifikatio-
nen bestätigen. Im bestpassenden der geschätzten Modelle findet sich mit schwa-
cher Signifikanz (je nach verwendeten Standardfehlern) ein negativer Zusam-
menhang zwischen Schusswaffenlizenzen und anderen Suiziden, was auf einen
Substitutionseffekt zwischen Methoden hindeuten könnte. Aus meiner Arbeit er-
geben sich zwei Beiträge. Einerseits gilt es Scheinzusammenhänge aus der Regu-
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lierungsdebatte herauszuhalten, was in Bezug auf [9] geschehen ist. Andererseits
ist die Bestätigung des positiven Zusammenhanges zwischen Schusswaffen und
Schusswaffensuiziden von Bedeutung für die ökonomische Literatur. Der von Phi-
lip Cook [5] vorgeschlagene FS/S- oder FSS-Proxy (Firearm Suicides / Suicides)
teilt die Schusswaffensuizide durch alle Suizide, um die Verbreitung von Schuss-
waffen in der Bevölkerung zu messen: Gibt es keine Schusswaffen, so nimmt die-
ser Proxy den Wert Null an. Hat jeder Suizidwillige Zugang zu Schusswaffen, ist
die Verbreitung von Schusswaffen also maximal, so ist es plausibel, dass auch der
Proxy sein Maximum annimmt. So stellt FSS die Verbreitung von Schusswaffen
in der Bevölkerung dar.
4 Tötungsdelikte in den USA
In den Vereinigten Staaten sind Tötungsdelikte ein absolut und relativ größeres
Problem als in Deutschland. In 2010 gab es dort 11,078 Tötungsdelikte (aus dem
Bereich der Gewaltkriminalität) mit Schusswaffen bei 16,008 Tötungsdelikten
insgesamt [25], was einer Tötungsdeliktrate von 5.2 auf 100,000 Einwohner und
einer Tötungsdeliktrate mit Schusswaffen von 3.6 auf 100,000 Einwohner ent-
spricht. In Deutschland gab es zum Vergleich 2,218 Tötungsdelikte, davon 147
mit Schusswaffenverwendung, was einer Rate von 2.7 und 0.2 auf 100,000 Ein-
wohner entspricht [10]. Der Frage, ob sich bei diesem gegenüber Deutschland
erhöhten Niveau beider Raten und unter Ausnutzung der regional unterschiedli-
chen Verbreitung von Schusswaffen [14] in den Vereinigten Staaten ein Zusam-
menhang zwischen Schusswaffen und Gewaltkriminalität finden lässt, sind Phi-
lip Cook und Jens Ludwig in ihrem Artikel “The social costs of gun ownership”
[4] nachgegangen. Bei fragwürdiger Signifikanz finden die Autoren in dieser
durch die Joyce Foundation finanzierten Studie einen positiven Zusammenhang
zwischen der durch den FSS-Proxy gemessenen Schusswaffenverbreitung und
Tötungsdelikten aller Art. Hieraus unterbreiten sie die Regulierungsempfehlung,
den Besitz von Schusswaffen im Bereich von USD 100 bis USD 1,800 jährlich
zu besteuern, um die Besitzer für die so vermeintlich nachgewiesenen sozialen
Kosten aufkommen zu lassen.
Bei der schwachen und nur unter sehr bestimmten Bedingungen von den Au-
toren erlangten Signifikanz des Ergebnisses erschien es mir von Interesse, einige
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kleinere ökonometrische Probleme zu adressieren um die Ergebnisse auf Robust-
heit gegen diese zu prüfen. Da die Autoren auf meine Anfrage hin mir ihren Da-
tensatz nicht zur Verfügung stellten, habe ich die Konstruktion des Datensatzes
selbst vorgenommen, was einen erheblichen Aufwand bedeutete (∼600 Seiten
Programmcode), es gleichzeitig aber ermöglichte, fünf weitere Jahre in die Un-
tersuchung aufzunehmen. Trotz großer Sorgfalt bei der Datenextraktion ist es
mir zwar möglich die Ergebnisse qualitativ, jedoch nicht numerisch exakt, zu re-
plizieren. Es stellt sich heraus, dass für die Signifikanz im Ergebnis von Cook und
Ludwig lediglich eine ignorierte lineare Restriktion verantwortlich ist, auf die
man bei einer gängigen Robustheitsüberprüfung stößt [30]. Berücksichtigt man
diese, so verschwinden alle von den Autoren genannten Ergebnisse. Die Grund-
lage für die Regulierungsempfehlung ist somit hinfällig.
5 Shlussfolgerungen
Zu school shootings ist eine methodisch rigide quantitative Untersuchung wün-
schenswert, um zu überprüfen, ob sich so Evidenz für einzelne Behauptungen
findet. Dass es hierfür mindestens eine geeignete quantitative Methode gibt, ha-
be ich ausführlich dargelegt. Meines Wissens existiert jedoch kein Datensatz, der
die hypothetisierten Einflussfaktoren für die bereits erfolgten Taten einheitlich
erfasst.
Der FSS-Proxy kann als Maß für die Verbreitung von Schusswaffen verwen-
det werden. Ein behaupteter Zusammenhang zwischen Schusswaffenverbreitung
und Suiziden aller Art lässt sich nicht messen.
Selbst bei der weiten und regional unterschiedlichen Verbreitung von Schuss-
waffen in den Vereinigten Staaten lässt sich anhand eines Panels von 200 Land-
kreisen und 25 Jahren kein Zusammenhang zwischen der Verbreitung von Schuss-
waffen und Gewaltkriminalität messen.
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Type Package
Title Simulation of Rare Events Case-Control Studies.
Version 0.9-1
Date 2012-04-20
Author Christian Westphal
Maintainer Christian Westphal <westphal@staff.uni-marburg.de>
Description All this package needs is some idea of a risk model and a
population description and it will generate a random
case-control-study from that risk model and population for you.
You may repeat this to simulate powers of testing models and such.
License GPL (>= 2)
Repository CRAN
Date/Publication 2012-09-28 15:04:03
NeedsCompilation no
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reccsim-package Simulate case-control studies.
Description
This package allows you to simulate case control-studies from a known population with binary
exogenous variables and a binary endogenous variable.
Details
Package: reccsim
Type: Package
Version: 0.9-1
Date: 2012-09-28
License: GPL (>=2)
reccsim’s functions are rccs and build.population as main workhorses and interactive.population
to instruct users in how the PopulationAtRisk object has to be set up.
For simulating a case-control study you need to feed a PopulationAtRisk to rccs (for random
case-control study). It will then return a case-control study which you may use for further analysis.
interactive.population will guide you through the construction of a PopulationAtRisk object,
however for repeated simulation with different population parameters you will usually want to call
build.population directly under specification of your population parameters.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
Maintainer: Christian Westphal <westphal@staff.uni-marburg.de>
References
Breslow, N.E. (1996) Statistics in Epidemiology: The Case-Control Study. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, Vol. 91 (433) pp. 14-28.
See Also
interactive.population
Examples
## Create a PopulationAtRisk manually from a risk formula
## where cancer is dependent on smoking and drinking:
## Try this with a population size of 500, 0.2 drinking
## 0.2 smoking and 0.1 smoking and drinking.
absolute.risk 3
## Use 2 and 5 and their product 10 for relative risks in the respective
## groups.
## PaR <- interactive.population( cancer ~ smoking + drinking )
PaR <- build.population( cancer ~ smoking + drinking,
50000000,
.0001,
c(.2,.2,.1),
c(2,5,10)
)
## Now the PopulationAtRisk object stored in PaR may be used
## to construct a case control study, where we use five times
## as many controls as cases:
ccs <- rccs( PaR, ctc = 5)
## This randomized case control study from the PopulationAtRisk
## is now ready for further analysis.
## Using build.population() instead of interactive.population()
## will allow automatization for studying how for e.g. the logit
## model estimator behaves for different population parameters.
## Let us have a short summary of this cas-control study:
summary( ccs )
absolute.risk Computes absolute risks from relative risks.
Description
absolute.risk computes the absolute risks (probabilities) for different groups from relative risks
and a population probability.
Usage
absolute.risk(pop.risk, pop.percentages, relative.risks)
Arguments
pop.risk This is the probability of an event over the complete population.
pop.percentages
This is a vector of population percentages as in build.population.
relative.risks This is a vector of relative risks as in build.population.
4 add.cases
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
build.population
Examples
## This will tell you the risks in percentages for a baseline group
## (relative risk of one)
## and the three groups making up 20%, 20% and 10% of the population
## with relative risks of 2, 5 and 10.
absolute.risk( .0001, c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
add.cases Computes how many additional cases a group generates.
Description
Given a population risk and size, a population distribution across groups and relative group risks
add.cases tells you how many additional cases a certain group generates compared with a com-
parison group.
Usage
add.cases(pop.size, pop.risk, pop.percentages, relative.risks)
Arguments
pop.size An integer giving the population size.
pop.risk A probability giving the overall probability across the whole population.
pop.percentages
The population distribution across some groups as in build.population.
relative.risks The group’s relative risks as in build.population.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
build.population
build.population 5
Examples
## There ist a population of 50 million. Overall risk for a population
## member of becoming a case is 0.0001.
## There are four groups: Two groups each making up 20 percent of the
## population and one group making up 10 percent of the population.
## The fourth group is the baseline group with a relative risk of one
## and its 50 percent of the population are calculated automatically
## from the other group’s percentages.
## The 20 percent groups are attributed with a relative risk of 2 and 5
## and the 10 percent group has a relative risk of 10.
## now add.cases will tell you, how many cases could be prevented if you
## were able to lower the overall risk by removing risk factors in the
## groups and thereby reducing a groups relative risk to one.
add.cases( 50000000, .0001, c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
build.population Builds a PopulationAtRisk object.
Description
Given a known set of population parameters, build.population builds a PopulationAtRisk object
which may be used in rccs for simulating a case control study.
Usage
build.population(formula, pop.size, pop.risk, pop.percentages, relative.risks)
Arguments
formula A formula object describing the dependent binary variable (whatever the pop-
ulation is at risk for) and the independent variables (whatever is supsected/may
influence the risk).
pop.size The overall size of the population.
pop.risk The overall population risk. I.e. the probability a random subject will exhibit
the endogenous binary variable.
pop.percentages
The percentages of the risk groups (vector), i.e. the groups having any of the
risk influencing factors. The percentage of the zero group (i.e. no factors) will
be automatically computed.
relative.risks The relative risks (vector) among the risk groups. Relative risk for the zero
group is automatically set to one.
6 expand
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
interactive.population, rccs
Examples
## We do have a population of 50 million people. Some (20%) consume steak,
## some (20%) consume beer, some (10%) consume both. Some consume neither.
## Those consuming steak do have twice the risk of getting cancer. Those
## who drink beer do have five times the risk of getting cancer. Those
## consuming both do have ten times (the product, which is approximately
## the equivalent to ’no interaction’ for rare events) of getting cancer.
PaR <- build.population( cancer ~ steak + beer,
50000000,
.0001,
c(.2,.2,.1),
c(2,5,10)
)
PaR
expand Formula expansion.
Description
Expands some formula for all possible terms and interaction terms. This is function is not intended
for the user.
Usage
expand(formula)
Arguments
formula
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
get.groups 7
Examples
expand( cancer ~ smoking + drinking )
## will return the full model:
## cancer ~ smoking * drinking
get.groups Extract population groups from a formula.
Description
Gets all possible population groups (interactions) from a formula.
Usage
get.groups(formula)
Arguments
formula This is an R formula
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
Examples
get.groups( cancer ~ smoking + drinking )
## will return the groups
## "smoking", "drinking" and "smoking:drinking"
get.main Get main effects from an R formula object.
Description
It will return all main effects from the formula (i.e. y~a*b expands to y~ a+b+a:b, main effects
are a and b) as a character vector.
Usage
get.main(formula)
Arguments
formula An R formula with operators "+", "*" , ":". Conditioning "|" is not implemented.
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Value
An object of class vector(mode="character", n) where n is the number of main effects in the
formula.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
Examples
get.main( cancer ~ smoking + drinking + smoking:drinking )
## will return:
## "smoking", "drinking"
interactive.population
Build a population at risk interactively.
Description
Helps you build a population at risk on at console.
Usage
interactive.population(formula)
Arguments
formula The formula has to describe your risk model, i.e. some outcome, say Y, has to de-
pend on some exogenous factors, say A,B. Then formulas like Y~A+B, Y~A*B, Y~A+A:B
all are valid risk models.
Details
interactive.population is intended to teach the user about the creation of the PopulationAtRisk
object used by rccs to generate random case-control studies. Usually for automatically trying dif-
ferent population parameters you will want to use the non-interactive function build.population
to create a PopulationAtRisk object.
Value
An object of class PopulationAtRisk.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
make.case.control.study 9
See Also
build.population, rccs
Examples
## Build a PopulationAtRisk with risk factors
## beer and steak and outcome cancer
## PaR <- interactive.population( cancer ~ beer + steak )
make.case.control.study
Construct a case-control-study data frame.
Description
Is used for combining a PopulationAtRisk object and a data frame of cases and a data frame of
controls to a CaseControlStudy object. Usually not needed to call directly. Is used by rccs.
Usage
make.case.control.study(PaR, cases, controls)
Arguments
PaR A PopulationAtRisk object as generated by build.population.
cases A data frame of cases as generated by make.cases.
controls A data frame of controls as generated by make.controls.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
make.cases, make.controls, rccs
Examples
## Set up the population:
PaR <- build.population( cancer ~ smoking + drinking, 5000000, .0001,
c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
## Generate random cases:
my.cases <- make.cases( PaR, TRUE )
## Generate random controls:
my.controls <- make.controls( PaR, my.cases, 5, TRUE )
10 make.cases
## Combine all three objects in a CaseControlStudy object
ccs <- make.case.control.study( PaR, my.cases, my.controls )
summary(ccs)
make.cases Generate cases from a population at risk.
Description
Generates a random data frame of cases based on the parameters held in a PopulationAtRisk
object.
Usage
make.cases(PopulationAtRisk, requireAllGroups = FALSE)
Arguments
PopulationAtRisk
requireAllGroups
Setting this to TRUE forces cases for all population groups, i.e. the generation of
cases is repeated until there are cases from all groups (chance for infinite loop).
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
make.controls, make.case.control.study, rccs
Examples
## First you generate a PopulationAtRisk named PaR with
## build.population or interactive.population.
## Then you run
## make.cases( PaR )
make.controls 11
make.controls Draw controls from a population at risk given observed cases.
Description
Generates a random data frame of controls based on the parameters held in a PopulationAtRisk
object and a data frame of cases. The latter is only used to determine the amount of controls to be
drawn.
Usage
make.controls(PopulationAtRisk, cases, ctc, requireAllGroups
= FALSE )
Arguments
PopulationAtRisk
cases An object returned by make.cases
ctc cases-to-controls: How many controls shall be drawn for each case (integer)?
requireAllGroups
Setting this to TRUE forces controls for all population groups, i.e. the drawing of
controls is repeated until there are controls from all groups (chance for infinite
loop).
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
make.cases, make.case.control.study, rccs
Examples
## First you generate a PopulationAtRisk named PaR with
## build.population or interactive.population.
## Then you run
## cases <- make.cases( PaR )
## make.controls( PaR, controls, 5 )
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rccs Construct a random case-control-study from a population at risk.
Description
This is a random case control study generator. Given a PopulationAtRisk object and a control
factor cf it will create random cases based upon the population at risk and complement the cases
with cf times as many random controls from the same population. It is reccsim’s main workhorse.
Usage
rccs(PaR, ctc = 5, requireAllGroups.cases = FALSE,
requireAllGroups.controls = FALSE)
Arguments
PaR This is a PopulationAtRisk object constructed either interactively via
interactive.population or manually from build.population.
ctc This has to be a positive integer telling rccs how many controls you want rela-
tive to the cases.
requireAllGroups.cases
Setting this to TRUE ensures there will be cases in all groups. The random pro-
cess may very well generate a set of cases where not all groups are represented
(depending on the probabilities). If requireAllGroups.cases is set to TRUE
and this happens, the result is rejected, the simulation gets repeated (chance for
infinite loop) and a warning is issued.
requireAllGroups.controls
Setting this to TRUE ensures there will be controls from all groups. The random
process may very well draw a set of controls where not all groups are repre-
sented (depending on the probabilities). If requireAllGroups.controls is set
to TRUE and this happens, the result is rejected, the simulation gets repeated
(chance for infinite loop) and a warning is issued.
Details
Setting requireAllGroups.cases and requireAllGroups.controls to TRUE ensures the exis-
tence of the MLE in a binary regression setting as described by Silvapulle 1981.
Value
CaseControlStudy
is of class CaseControlStudy (a list of length 2) containing the PopulationA-
tRisk at first and the case control study as data.frame at the second position.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
risk.difference 13
References
Silvapulle, Mervyn J. (1981) On the Existence of Maximum Likelihood Estimators for the Binomial
Response Models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, Vol. 43 (3) pp. 310-313.
See Also
summary, build.population, interactive.population
Examples
## We do have a population of 50 million people. Some (20%) consume steak,
## some (20%) consume beer, some (10%) consume both. Some consume neither.
## Those consuming steak do have twice the risk of getting cancer. Those
## who drink beer do have five times the risk of getting cancer. Those
## consuming both do have ten times (the product, which is approximately
## the equivalent to ’no interaction’ for rare events) of getting cancer.
PaR <- build.population( cancer ~ steak + beer, 50000000, .0001,
c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
## This will give a random case control study from the above population
## where you do get five times as many controls as cases.
ccs <- rccs( PaR, ctc = 5 )
summary( ccs )
risk.difference Computes the absolute risk difference between groups.
Description
Given a known population risk, a known population distribution across groups and known rela-
tive risks for these groups, risk.difference computes the absolute risk difference (probability
differences) between the groups and a comparison groups with relative risk = 1.
Usage
risk.difference(pop.risk, pop.percentages, relative.risks)
Arguments
pop.risk As in build.population.
pop.percentages
As in build.population.
relative.risks As in build.population.
14 summary.CaseControlStudy
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
build.population
Examples
risk.difference( .0001, c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
summary.CaseControlStudy
Summarize a case-control-study.
Description
Summarize a case-control-study.
Usage
## S3 method for class ’CaseControlStudy’
summary( object, ... )
Arguments
object A CaseControlStudy object as generated by make.case.control.study.
... Generic arguments.
Author(s)
Christian Westphal
See Also
rccs
Examples
## Set up the PopulationAtRisk:
PaR <- build.population( cancer~smoking+drinking, 5000000, .0001,
c(.2,.2,.1), c(2,5,10) )
## Generate a random case-control study from it:
ccs <- rccs(PaR, 5, TRUE, TRUE)
## Summarize the case-control study:
summary(ccs)
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School shootings are often used in public policy debate as a justification
for increased regulation, based on qualitative arguments. However, to date,
no effort has been made to find valid quantitative evidence for the claims
bolstering the regulation recommendations. In defense of this absence of
evidence, it is usually argued that the rarity of such events does not allow the
employment of quantitative methods. This paper, using a simulation study,
shows that, based on the number of school shootings in the United States
and Germany combined, the well-known method of logistic regression can
be applied to a case-control study, making it possible to at least test for an
association between hypothesized influential variables and the occurrences.
Moderate relative risks, explained by an observed variable, would lead to a
high power of the appropriate test. A moderate numbers of cases generated
by such a variable would suffice to show a significant association.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introdution
The qualitative scientific literature from multiple fields contains a great many
claims about what causally leads to the occurrence of school shootings, or, what is
at least associatedwith the occurrence of such tragic events. Some of these claims
are employed in public policy debate as a justification for increased regulatory
action, and thereby have the potential to influence social welfare, even though
these claims, while they may seem “obvious”, are not backed up by quantitative
evidence. A partial and compact overview of these claims is found in Kleck (1999:
2) and is quoted here in its entirety to illustrate the diversity of claims made:
guns, “assault weapons”, large-capacity ammunition magazines,
lax regulation of gun shows; the failure of parents to secure guns,
school cliques, and the exclusion of “outsiders”; bullying and taunt-
ing in schools, especially by high school athletes; inadequate school
security, especially a lack of metal detectors, armed guards, locker
searches, and so forth; excessively large high schools; inadequate
monitoring of potentially violent students by schools; lazy, uninvolved
Baby Boomer parents and correspondingly inadequate supervision of
their children; young killers not being eligible for death penalty; a lack
of religion, especially in schools; violentmovies and television; violent
video games; violentmaterial and communications on theWorldWide
Web/Internet (including bomb-making instructions); anti-Semitism,
neo-Nazi sentiments, and Hitler worship; “Industrial” music, Marilyn
Manson’s music, and other “dark” variants of rock music; Satanism;
“Goth” culture among adolescents; and Southern culture.
All of these claims can be modeled as binary variables and the outcome, of
course, is binary as well: a school shooting either happens or does not. For the
quantitative analyst, it seems obvious to search for a significant association be-
tween the events and the hypothesized influencing variables. A theoretical model
lending itself to this purpose is given in Robertz (2004) (an excellent book that
is, unfortunately, not available in an English translation), where “fantasy” is con-
sidered a latent variable, influenced by exogenous variables, and, when pushed
too hard, possibly leads to extremely deviant behavior, i.e., a school shooting.
Then the “choice” of committing a school shooting depends on the influencing
variables; hence we are dealing with a choice model, which can be modeled and
estimated as a logistic model (see Manski and Lerman, 1977). In epidemiology,
these models are called incidence models (see Prentice and Pyke, 1979). As King
and Zeng (2001b) point out, when occurrence (or nonoccurrence) is rare, col-
lecting a random sample with even one occurrence may become prohibitively ex-
pensive, which is clearly the case with school shootings as, fortunately, only very
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few students choose to kill their peers and teachers. Prentice and Pyke (1979)
and Manski and Lerman (1977) show that collecting the occurrences and adding
a random sample of nonoccurrences (or vice versa, depending on what is labeled
as an occurrence) allows for consistent estimation of the logistic regression pa-
rameters from such a case-control study. A very good summary of these statistical
methods in conjunction with case-control studies can be found in Breslow (1996).
For the problem at hand let us take as our population the “enrolled student
years.” I define an “enrolled student year” as each year an individual student
is enrolled in school. I refrain from specifically stating what schools and which
grades should be included; these choices will need to be made at the time of
application. With this definition, we can easily measure the number of “enrolled
student years that did not lead to a school shooting” and those that did. Following
Robertz’ (2004) definition of what constitutes a “school shooting,” there were 72
cases from 1992 to 2009, committed by male students from 10 to 34 years old
in the United States and Germany combined (Robertz and Wickenhäuser, 2010:
14). In the same time frame, there were around 500 million years of education
provided to male students and around 1 billion years of education for both sexes,
revealing the rarity, indeed, the extreme rarity, of school shootings. The goal of
the case-control study is to find a statistically significant association, and better
yet, causality, between the occurrence of school shootings and above-mentioned
variables.
The method of case-control studies is examined by King and Zeng (2001b)
(see also an intuitive explanation and application in King and Zeng, 2001a) for
the case of rare events, which King and Zeng define as “dozens to thousands of
times fewer ones . . . than zeroes” (King and Zeng, 2001b: 138). From the num-
bers above, I am interested in how these methods perform in finite samples when
the occurrence is millions to tens of millions times more rare than nonoccurrence;
72 in 500 million would be 1.44 occurrences in 10 million and 72 in 1 billion
would be 0.72 occurrences in 10 million.
A viable way to draw a valid inference would be to construct a data set of all
cases and controls, with the controls either randomly drawn from the population
or artificial controls generated from known population parameters. The next step
would be to group all hypothesized variables into two (or more) binary factors,
assuming that none of the variables are negatively correlated and that none ex-
hibit coefficients of opposed directions.1 Next, check whether these factors have
a statistically significant association with the outcome. Depending on how fac-
tors are constructed (“and” and “or” junctions come to mind), conclusions may
be drawn from the test result, factor groups may be ruled out, and a stepwise
search for individual variables may be constructed. Given this obvious arbitrary
1An assumption that is not contradicted anywhere in the qualitative literature.
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interchangeability between individual variables and factors, the terms “variables”
and “factors” are used interchangeably below.
This paper contributes to the literature by pointing out an easy-to-use quan-
titative method for measuring the association of (binary) factors with the occur-
rence of school shootings (in Section 2) and by examining via a simulation study
what sort of relative risk a certain factor, for example, constructed as described
above, would have to impose on individuals in order to show positive associa-
tion in a logistic regression model (in Sections 3 and 4). My core findings are
presented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. A software package designed to repeat the
simulation procedure for specific settings is provided, and its use is illustrated
for an example setting. The main result shows that for plausible population
sizes and overall probability of occurrence, only very few cases would need to
be generated by an exogenous factor to find a significant association with the
occurrences. Unfortunately, there is no data set, at least to my knowledge, that
measures the above-mentioned variables for every school shooting that has ever
occurred. Thus, putting the hypotheses to a meaningful test will require retro-
spectively collecting the data necessary for the cases and the control populations.
2 Methods
For a binary random variable Y = [y1 y2 . . . yT ]
′ denoting the occurrence
yt = 1 or nonoccurrence yt = 0 for sample member t = 1,2, . . . , T of an event
influenced by some exogenous variables xt = [x1,t x2,t . . . xK ,t] and thereby
X = [x′1 x
′
2 . . . x
′
T ]
′, the logistic regression model
pit = Pr(yt = 1|xt) = (1+ exp{−xtβ})
−1 (1)
with β = [β1 β2 . . . βK]
′ can be used to estimate and test for the effects β .
Under random sampling from the population at risk – that is, every unit t that
has a chance of becoming an occurrence – maximum likelihood methods allow
for consistent and asymptotically normal estimation of β with the log-likelihood
log L(β |Y,X) = −
T∑
t=1
log
 
1+ exp{(1− 2yt)xtβ}

(2)
yielding the estimator βˆ . It can be shown (see Prentice and Pyke, 1979; McCul-
lagh and Nelder, 1989: 111–114) that maximizing the likelihood
L(β |X,Y) =
T∏
t=1
Pr(xt |yt) (3)
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of retrospective (choice-based) sampling yields the same estimator βˆ , except for
the intercept β0. The intercept can be consistently estimated from this likelihood
by
βˆ0 − log
  y¯
1− y¯
 1−E [yt]
E [yt]

(4)
a correction that, with knowledge of E [yt], can and should be applied (see King
and Zeng, 2001b: 144 and Section 6.2).
Using the corrected version of βˆ for estimating probabilities for some x f via
(1+exp{−x f βˆ})
−1 results in consistent but biased estimates due to two problems
pointed out by King and Zeng (2001b: 145–150). First, there is a bias in βˆ , which
can be estimated using the following bias estimation from King and Zeng (2001b),
which is based on McCullagh and Nelder (1989: 119–120,455–456):
Ôbias(βˆ) = (X′WX)−1X′Wξ (5)
with ξ = 0.5tr(Q)

(1+ w1)pˆit − w1

, tr being the trace operator, wt being w1 =
E (yt)/ y¯ for cases, w0 = (1 − E (yt))/(1 − y¯) for non-case,s and pˆit being the
estimated probabilities of occurrence for unit t from βˆ . Q= X(X′WX)−1X′ and W
is the diagonal matrix constructed from the pˆit(1−pˆit)wt . Applying this correction
also reduces variance for the bias-corrected estimator β˜ = βˆ −Ôbias(βˆ) (see King
and Zeng, 2001b: 147,161).
Second, when probabilities are then estimated from β˜ via
p˜i f = Pr(y f = 1|x f , β˜) = (1+ exp{x f β˜})
−1 (6)
it must be kept in mind that changes in β˜ usually do not affect p˜i f symmetrically
and hence do not cancel out. The probability calculation can be corrected for this
problem by considering the distribution fβ˜ of β˜ :
Pr(y f = 1|x f ) =
∫
D(β )
Pr(y f = 1|x f , β˜) fβ˜ (β˜)dβ˜ (7)
which can be estimated by using an estimation of the distribution fβ˜ and can
furthermore be approximated (see King and Zeng, 2001b: 149,161–162) by
Pr(Yf = 1|x f ) ≈ p˜i f + C f (8)
C f = (0.5− p˜i f )p˜i f (1− p˜i f )x0V (β˜)x
′
0 (9)
where x0 are the exogenous values for some arbitrarily chosen comparison group
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andV (·) is the covariancematrix. Using the estimated distribution of β˜ , Equation
(8) becomes a Bayesian estimator (see King and Zeng, 2001b: 149).
Equations (4) and (5) are implemented in Imai, King and Lau (2012). The
correction in Equatin (9) is easily made by using, for example, the R function
fitted.values().
3 Simulation
3.1 Software
For the simulation, I wrote an R-package named resim (Westphal, 2012),
standing for rare events case-control study simulation. The package’s main func-
tionalities are:
1. Building a PopulationAtRisk object. This object describes how the cases
come to happen under a specific hypothesis and given a set of parameters,
describing how factors/variables are distributed among the population.
2. Creating a pseudo-random case-control study data.frame from that Pop-
ulationAtRisk that then may be used for model estimation, for example
with Imai, King and Lau (2012).
3.2 Parameters for Simulation
Assume an event’s probability of occurrence to be 1 in 10 million, which is some-
where between the observed frequency of school shootings committed by “male
enrolled student years” and “all student years,” as set out in Section 1. Also con-
sider two assumed factors, for example, an individual’s access to “Guns” and an
individual’s consumption of violent computer “Games,” influencing the individ-
ual probability Pr(yt = 1|Guns,Games); note that for my analysis, it does not
matter what two factors are assumed and, indeed, if one wishes to be as abstract
as possible, a simple A and B will suffice. The issues that arise from these as-
sumptions involve, first, that Equation (8) is not proven to be uniformly superior
over the other estimators reported above. How do the bias corrections behave
for extremely rare events and for different quantities of interest (QIs) discussed
below? More importantly, what relative risk – given a population size and over-
all probability of occurrence – is needed to identify influencing factors? What
happens when the model is not correctly specified? How does increasing the size
of the control group relative to the case group affect the results? As shorthand
for this last question, I will use the term controls-to-case ratio (as in Hennessy
et al., 1999), abbreviated by CTC . To aid in answering these questions, I give an
example distribution of the variables among the population in Table 1. The as-
sumed factors of influence are two binary variables “Guns” and “Games.” There
is slight association between “Guns” and “Games.” I will search for relative risks
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necessary to identify these variables’ (factors’) influence for population sizes of
100 million, 200 million, 500 million, and 1 billion, the latter two figures approxi-
mating the real-world setting (see the Introduction). Based on these populations,
10, 20, 50, and 100 cases, respectively are expected from the aggregated binomial
experiment. For multiple hypotheses testing, the type-I-error is set to 0.1 and a
power of 0.98 for the test is considered sufficient. Note that the test’s power re-
quirement is specified very conservatively to protect my results from weak claims
about necessary conditions for the method to function as intended. The marginal
frequency for Guns in Table 1 is a very rough computation based on household
gun ownership density in the United States and Germany under the assumption
of independence between household gun ownership and school children. The
marginal frequency for Games is simply a guess based on personal experience,
and conveniently symmetrical to the marginal frequencies of gun availability. The
joint frequency between both variables is, frankly, an arbitrary choice.
I will evaluate the correctly specified model – given here in R’s formula
notation – Shooting ∼ Guns + Games, as well as the underspecified model
Shooting ∼ Guns, but leave the discussion of interaction effects to future re-
search, seeing as the arguably necessary “explicit theory” in Berry, Meritt and
Esarey (2010: 261-262) is yet to be posited.
Guns/Games 0 1
∑
0 0.50 0.20 0.70
1 0.20 0.10 0.30∑
0.70 0.30 1.00
Table 1: Distribution of the population for simulation with assumed factors Guns
and Games
Thus, the groups are as follows: “0” – the group having neither guns nor
playing games; “Guns” – the group only having guns; “Games” – the group only
playing violent games; and “Guns:Games” – the group having guns and playing
violent video games.
I varied the relative risks r ri as follows. piGuns/pi0 = r rGuns from 1 to 10
in increments of 0.2. piGames/pi0 = r rGames was ∈ {1,2, 5, 10} for each value of
piGames/pi0. Because for reasonably small probabilities, the odds ratio approxi-
mates the relative risk, we can compute
r rGuns,Games = piGuns,Games/pi0 ≈ ORGuns,Games
= exp{βGuns + βGames}= ORGuns ·ORGames ≈ piGuns/pi0 ·piGames/pi0, (10)
with pii being the probability of occurrence in group i, when there is no interac-
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tion. pi is group i’s proportion of the population (notation as in King and Zeng,
2002). There was a restriction of
10−7 = pi= p0pi0 + pGunspiGuns + pGamespiGames + pGuns,GamespiGuns,Games (11)
to account for the aforementioned occurrence of 1 in 10 million. For each set
of parameters, the model estimation was repeated 10,000 times with a random
case-control study generated each time. To ensure the existence of the maximum
likelihood estimator (see Silvapulle, 1981), generated case-control studies with
empty groups among either the cases or the controls were rejected. Therefore,
my results are estimations of theoretical properties of the estimators conditional
on the nonexistence of empty groups. This restriction can be easily satisfied in
applications by restricting analysis to situations where cases are observed from
all groups and increasing the CTC until there are controls from all groups, if
necessary.
4 Results
In this section, I set out the simulation results. Unless otherwise noted, figures
in the text refer to the population of 1 billion and a controls-to-cases ratio of
CTC = 5. Results for different population sizes and different CTCs can be found
in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Increasing the CTC does not change the results much. Vary-
ing the population size has a notable impact, as the number of cases generated
varies. For a population of 100 million, the effects could not be found with a high
enough power. The power of the test for βGuns maxes out at 0.86 for a population
of 100 million in the case of underspecification and at 0.79 for correct model
specification. This is in accordance with the results of Peduzzi et al. (1996);
there are simply not enough events per variable.2 My requirements for the power
are much stricter than the powers reported in Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007:
715) and therefore my results, when interpreted in terms of events per variable
(see Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007), differ, too.
4.1 Corretly Speied Model
4.1.1 Point Estimates
King and Zeng’s theoretical results of β˜ having less bias and less variance show
in my results where β˜0 has up to a 10% smaller RMSE
3 than βˆ0 and β˜A has up to a
7% smaller RMSE4 than βˆA. The RMSE ratios depending on r rGuns are illustrated
2Also note how Westphal (2012) could easily be applied to re-study Peduzzi et al.’s topic.
318% and 24% for populations of 500 and 200 million, respectively.
414% and 21% for populations of 500 and 200 million, respectively.
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in Figure 1. They look similar for different population sizes.
The average absolute difference in bias between bothmethods for all parameter
sets is around eight times as high as the average absolute difference in variance.
My findings differ from King and Zeng when it comes to the estimation of
probabilities. Using King’s β˜ increases the RMSE of p˜i0 up to 12% over simple
prior correction.5 Using King and Zeng’s Bayesian method increases RMSE by
30%.6 This increase of RMSE approaches zero for increasing pi0and likely will
completely disappear or even reverse for larger pi0 than I simulated. Evidence
for the latter conjecture is found in King and Zeng (2001b: Figure 6), where
an X of 2.3 approximately represents a relative risk of 10 between the “groups”
X = 0 and X = 2.3. That Figure clearly shows, that much higher relative risks are
needed to find the Bayesian estimator superior. The same cannot be said about
p˜iGuns. While the RMSE of p˜iGuns itself seems to improve with increasing piGuns, it
becomes worse for the Bayesian estimator. It therefore appears that some caution
is advisable when applying King’s methods to extremely rare events in an effort
to determine the probability estimations for the groups.
When estimating relative risks, using β˜ shows huge improvement in variance
and bias over using βˆ (see Figure 1 (a)–(d), population size: 1 billion, CTC = 5).
Obvious improvement is achieved by using King and Zeng’s Bayesian correction
in mean squared error; however its magnitude seems to be negligible (maximum
ratio observed:
2.5·107p
10).
Another quantity of interest is the power of the test. Due to its lower bias
and variance, King and Zeng’s estimator β˜ is preferable to βˆ in terms of the test’s
power. The interesting section of the approximate power curve for the 1 billion
population is shown in Figure 1 (e). Figure 1 (f) clearly shows that King and
Zeng’s estimator β˜ is superior in specifity and sensitivity to βˆ in this setting.
4.1.2 Condene Intervals
Confidence intervals for the quantities of interest (i) coefficients β j where j ∈
{Guns,Games}, (ii) probabilities pii, i ∈ {Guns,Games, (Guns,Games)}, and (iii)
relative risks r ri can be simulated. Imai, King and Lau (2012) provide the func-
tion sim() for conducting this simulation. Due to the number of simulations
needed, I used the method described by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000: 349–
350) and King and Zeng (2002: 1419) directly by using Genz et al. (2012), and
the saved point estimates and estimated coefficients’ covariance matrices from
the output generated by Imai, King and Lau (2012) for simulating 1, 000 draws
from each of the β estimators’ posteriors, mimicking sim()’s behavior. I set the
nominal level of coverage at 90% for all simulations.
533% and 100% for populations of 500 and 200 million, respectively.
680% and 350% for populations of 500 and 200 million, respectively.
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Figure 1: βˆ vs. β˜ , population 1 billion, CTC = 5
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As to relative risks, Figure 2 (a) shows that neither the logit estimator with
prior correction nor King’s corrected estimator dominate when the model is spec-
ified correctly. When misspecified, however, King and Zeng’s corrected estimator
clearly beats the logit estimator with prior correction (Figure 2 (b)). Each point
in Figure 2 represents one set of relative risks with r rB indicated by the point’s
color. For the probability estimation, confidence interval coverage for both esti-
mators is far too low (in the region of 40%) for the underspecification and way
too high (starting at 93% and reaching up to 100%) for the correct specification.
4.2 Varying Population Size
Varying the population size from 100 million to 200 million, 500 million, or 1 bil-
lion does not change the direction of the results. The relative difference between
the RMSEs of relative risk estimation appear to increase quadratically. Therefore,
King and Zeng’s correction is the more important the smaller the population/the
rarer the event. The population size of 100 million did not yield high enough
powers. For all other population sizes Table 2 shows some pivotal characteristics
of the power of the test for β˜ .
4.3 Quantities of Interest
For the specific application of school shootings and possible contributing factors,
there are multiple quantities of interest, set out for populations of 200 million,
500 million, and 1 billion in Table 2, 3, and 4. Below, I briefly discuss these
quantities of interest.
The Maximum r rGuns Needed to Reach a Power of 0.98. Which was the
largest r rGuns, unconditional on r rGames, that yielded at least a simulated power
of 0.98? Additionally, in the appropriate table rows, the value of r rGames under
which this value was found is given. The meaning of this value is that to achieve
a test power of 0.98, and given all r rGames I simulated, r rGuns of the figure given in
the table, or larger, will lead to a rather powerful test. The hypothesis test I con-
ducted is two sided. Hence, a possible criticism is that, possibly, my power (i.e.,
the rejection of the null hypothesis) is being erroneously bolstered by a percent-
age of significant negative coefficient estimates. However, for relative risks ≥ 2.4,
2 out of 1.56 million simulation results exhibit this characteristic. Therefore, this
potential problem seems of little concern.7
The Minimum r rGuns Needed to Reach a Power of 0.98. Which was the
smallest r rGuns, unconditional on r rGames, that yielded at least a simulated power
of 0.98? In the appropriate table rows, the value of r rGames under which this
value was found is given. The meaning of this value is, that to achieve a test
7The figures are of similar negligible size for cases other than a population size of 1 billion,
CTC = 5 and the respective relative risks reported in Tables 2 and 3.
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power of 0.98, r rGuns smaller than this value never resulted in a power of ≥ 0.98.
Cases Attributable to a Factor. The quantities of interest (QI) (c) and (d)
in Tables 2 and 3 require some explanation: Given the different probabilities of
occurrence in the (four) different groups there is a baseline probability of pi0 for
units without exposure to risk-influencing factors. So if one could remove the
probability increasing factors from the non-zero groups, these groups’ pii would
switch to pi0. The groups would still generate cases, but at a lower probability.
Therefore, the difference in probabilities between pii and pi0 multiplied by the
size of the subpopulation in group i tells us how many additional cases group i is
responsible for, from nowon called cases attributable to group i: CAGi . Attributing
CAGi to a factor is easy when only one factor increases the relative risk of group
i. In that situation, CAGi is fully attributable to this factor and therefore can be
written as cases attributable to factor j conditional on the group i: CAF j|i. When
r rk 6= j > 1, k ∈ {Guns,Games}, r r j,k is computed as in Equation (10). Therefore,
not all CAGGuns,Games can be attributed to a single factor. I split them between the
factors using the weights of groups “Guns” and “Games” relative risks logarithm
in the logarithm of the relative risk of group “Guns,Games”:
CAGGuns,Games = population · pGuns,Games · (piGuns,Games −pi0) (12)
CAF j|Guns,Games = CAGGuns,Games ·
log(r r j)
log(r rGuns,Games)
(13)
This measure meets the following requirements for a > 1, b ≥ 1: (i) For a >
b log(a)/ log(ab) > 0.5. (ii) For a < b log(a)/ log(ab) < 0.5. (iii) For a =
b log(a)/ log(ab) = 0.5. (iv) For b = 1 log(a)/ log(ab) = 1. In each case, a
and b may be substituted by r rGuns and r rGames.
It is interesting that in a case where a second factor imposes a high relative
risk, fewer cases are attributable to the first variable under the minimum identi-
fication requirement. I conjecture that the explanation for this can be found in
Equation (10): under the assumption of no interaction between the linear terms,
an additional variable with a relative risk > 1 leads to a multiplicative effect for
the relative risk and therefore has an multiplicative effect on the number of cases
exhibiting the factor relative to the number of cases not exhibiting the factor. The
CAG can be computed by using the function add.ases() in Westphal (2012).
4.4 Inreasing the Controls-to-Case Ratio
The original CTC was set at five times as many controls as cases (in accordance
with Hennessy et al., 1999) in each case-control study. As King and Zeng (2001b:
141) state, for rare events, most information lies in the cases, and not in the
controls. In my setting, initially there are no controls in the data and I use the
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QI Population size in million 200 500 1000
(Expected no. of cases) (20) (50) (100)
(a)
Max. r rGuns needed to reach NA 3.8 2.4
a power of 0.98 (r rGames = 10)
(b)
Min. r rGuns needed to reach 8.2 3.4 2.4
a power of 0.98 (r rGames = 1)
(c)
CAFGuns|· is
14/20 22/50 30/100
X out of Y (X/Y ) expected
cases given r rGames = 1 and QI (b)
from this table
(d)
CAFGuns|· is
NA 14/50 17/100
X out of Y (X/Y ) expected
cases given r rGames = 10 and QI (a)
from this table
Table 2: Power of testing for βA for different population sizes.
number of cases to determine the number of controls. Obviously, when there
are very few cases compared to the population size, this method generates very
few controls compared to the population size. King and Zeng (2001b: 153–157)
undertake their analysis by dropping a percentage of controls from the data; I
add some controls to the data. Hence, I approach the problem from the opposite
direction: that is, King and Zeng start with 100% of controls, I start with none.
Table 3 sets out the results for a range of “zeroes dropped,” which is different
from King and Zeng (2001b), who drop, at most, 90% of the non-cases.
As to be expected, adding more controls necessarily reduces variance. These
effects are also shown in Table 3. Unfortunately, increasing the number of con-
trols is costly in two ways. Obviously, research costs increase due to having to
collect a larger control sample. Not so obviously, the cost of learning about the
estimators’ behavior increases because simulations take longer. The simulations I
conducted for a single population size took about two days for a CTC of 5, about
as long for a CTC of 10, twice as long for a CTC of 50 and would have taken
around 60 days for a CTC of 500 on a state-of-the-art personal computer with-
out any parallelization. Tables 2 and 3, QIs (a), (b), (e), and (f), show that the
marginal returns measured in indentifying influential variables at lower relative
risks depend on population size and the numbers of cases expected to be gener-
ated.
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CTC
(expected % of non-cases dropped)
5 10 50
Pop. Size QI (99.99994) (99.999989) (99.99949)
200 mio.
(a) NA 8 6.2
(b) 8.2 6.8 6.2
(c) 14/20 13/20 12/20
(d) NA 9/20 8/20
(e) 7.6 6.6 6.2
(f) 6.4 6 5.4
Max. MSEár rGuns 20.5 18.6 16.2
(r rGuns, r rGames) (10,1) (10,10) (10,1)
Max. MSE år rGuns,Games 4007 3681 2992
(r rGuns, r rGames) (10,10) (10,10) (10,10)
500 mio.
(a) 3.8 3.4 3.0
(b) 3.4 3.2 3.0
(c) 22/50 20/50 19/50
(d) 14/50 12/50 11/50
(e) 3.4 3.2 3.0
(f) 3.0 2.8 2.8
Max. MSEár rGuns 21.3 20.0 18.8
(r rGuns, r rGames) (10,2) (10,2) (10,2)
Max. MSE år rGuns,Games 4804 4219 3334
(r rGuns, r rGames) (9.6,10) (9.8,10) (9.8,10)
1 bio.
(a) 2.4 2.4 2.2
(b) 2.4 2.4 2.2
(c) 30/100 30/100 27/100
(d) 17/100 17/100 15/100
(e) 2.4 2.4 2.2
(f) 2.2 2.0 2.0
Max. MSEÝr rA 11.5 9.65 9.42
(r rA, r rB) (10,10) (10,10) (10,5)
Max. MSEÞr rAB 2740 2270 1874
(r rA, r rB) (10,10) (10,10) (10,10)
Table 3: Effects of increasing the CTC for different quantities of interest (QI), (e)
and (f) explained in table 4.
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4.5 Inreasing the Probability
My simulations did not vary overall probability of occurrence. However, it is
easy to see that, given constant relative risks, increasing overall probability of
occurrence necessarily increases probability of occurrence for all groups. From
King and Zeng (2001b: Equation (6)), we know that variance for βˆ decreases
with increasing pi:
V (βˆ) =
 T∑
t=1
pit(1−pit)x
′
txt

−1
∂ (pit −pi
2
t )/∂ pit = 1− 2pit > 0∀pit ∈ (0,0.5)
and thereby decreasing its inverse.
(14)
Therefore, under the assumption of βˆ ’s bias not increasing with pi – for example,
when doubling pi and cutting population size in half – a lower relative risk will
be needed to find the influence of a factor when the number of (expected) cases
remains the same. The aforementioned assumption can be justified by Peduzzi
et al. (1996: Figure 2) in combination with King and Zeng (2001b: Figure 4)
and maybe shown from Equation (5).
4.6 Underspeied Model
Between Guns and Games there is a phi coefficient ofφ = 1
21
, i.e., a very weak as-
sociation. Nevertheless, despite how weak this association seems to be, its effect
when underspecifying the model as Shooting ∼ Guns is notable when looking
at the power of the test in Table 4. Group “Guns”’ effect is now found sooner for
high relative risks in group “Games.” Of course, while the test result is correct in
a binary choice fashion, the improved power is not due to the test somehow be-
comingmore sensitive but due to falsely loading explanatory power from “Games”
onto “Guns” (see Lee, 1982: 207, Proposition 2). Finding a “Guns”’ effect sooner
for a non-influential “Games” when the model is specified as Shooting ∼ Guns
is due to reduction in variance, which itself is due to, in this case correct, model
building.
QI Population size in million 200 500 1000
(e)
Max. r rA needed to reach 7.6 3.4 2.4
a power of 0.98 (r rB = 1)
(f)
Min. r rA needed to reach 6.4 3.0 2.2
a power of 0.98 (r rB = 10)
Table 4: Power for different population sizes, underspecified model, CTC = 5
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Moreover, King and Zeng’s coefficient bias correction now has the most influ-
ence on the relative risk bias when the influence of “Games” is lowest instead of
highest. Apart from that, results change neither in direction nor (much) in effect
size.
5 Conlusion
This paper shows that even for extremely rare events with binary exogenous vari-
ables, the logistic regression model is well worth to study in attempting (a) find
association and (b) estimate relative risks when a serious effect from some factor
is conjectured. Also note that for binary exogenous variables, no belief in the
logistic form has to be held; it is simply an elaborate test for proportions.
This study revealed under what exogenous parameter settings confirmatory
data analysis can be used to evaluate hypotheses derived from qualitative case
studies of extremely rare events. King and Zeng’s methods are very helpful, but
must be applied selectively, depending on the researcher’s quantities of interest.
The reduction in mean squared error for the relative risk estimation compared to
that achieved by the logistic regression maximum likelihood estimator is remark-
able when used in the context of extremely rare events – even for a population
size of 1 billion. When estimating relative risks or when searching for signifi-
cance, there is no reason not to apply this correction (implemented in Imai, King
and Lau, 2012) when dealing with case-control studies. Although its power does
not improve dramatically, it will always offer some improvement due to the de-
creased bias and variance.
Based on the current paper and the work of King and Zeng (2001b,a), I sug-
gest the following rules of thumb:
1. Effects can be found even for extremely rare events under moderate require-
ments for the relative risks imposed by the explanatory factors.
2. For different quantities of interest under different parameters, different
methods have to be applied.
3. The more one factor’s influence is hidden by another factor’s influence, the
more important become Equations (5) and (7).
Moreover, Westphal (2012) can be used to easily compare the methods de-
scribed in Section 2 of this paper across plausible parameter sets, given a real
world research problem. Indeed this should be a valid method for studying school
shootings and, if properly conducted, may result in some actual quantitative evi-
dence that may help society more effectively deal with this tragic problem.
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Abstract
In 2006, a study, published in the Journal of Public Economics, employ-
ing a panel regression of 200 U.S. counties across 20 years, found a sig-
nificant elasticity of homicides with respect to firearms ownership. Based
on this finding the authors made the public policy recommendation of tax-
ing gun ownership. However that study fell prey to the ratio fallacy, a trap
known since 1896. All the “explanatory power” (goodness-of-fit-wise and
significance-wise) of the original analysis was due to regional and intertem-
poral differences and population being explained by itself. When the ratio
fallacy is accounted for, all authors’ results can no longer be found. This is
illustrated in this paper using a balanced panel from the data for 1980 to
2004. My findings are robust to (i) alternative specifications not subject to
the ratio problem, (ii) using only data from 1980 to 1999 as in the origi-
nal paper, (iii) using an unbalanced panel for 1980 to either 1999 or 2004,
(iv) applying weighting as done by the original authors and (v) using data
aggregated at the state level.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introdution
The association between guns and crime has been and continues to be a topic
of intense debate in society at large and among social scientists. The debate
intensified after Lott and Mustard (1997) published results showing that crime
declined following the passing of shall-issue laws1 for concealed carry handgun
licenses. This finding sparked a furious academic debate across disciplines. Po-
litical scientists, legal scholars, criminologists, economists and scientists working
in medical fields all added their voices to the discussion. From my perspective,
the most noteworthy (for data and methods used, as well as results) economet-
ric studies on guns and crime appearing after Lott and Mustard (1997) include
Ludwig (1998); Duggan (2001); Leenaars and Lester (2001); Cook and Ludwig
(2003, 2006); Cook et al. (2007) and Leigh and Neill (2010). Some works in
this area bear strongly worded titles that rather clearly reflect their authors’ per-
spectives: “Shooting Down More Guns, Less Crime” (Ayres and Donohue 2003b),
“The Final Bullet in the Body of the More Guns Less Crime Hypothesis” (Dono-
hue 2003) and “The Latest Misfires in Support of the More Guns, Less Crime
Hypothesis” (Ayres and Donohue 2003a). These titles illustrate the intensity of
the debate, which is also evident in Lott (2010: Chapter 7). Academic research
results became increasingly important in the public and legal arenas. This can be
seen in Fox and McDowall (2008: III.1.A), which begins with the bold statement
“There is A Proven Correlation between the Availability of Handguns
and Incidents of Violence.”
and then goes on to draw on findings from Duggan (2001). In Fox and McDowall
(III.1.C 2008), a result from (Cook et al. 2007: Section 4) is used to bolster
their argument. Eventually, more refined econometric methods were applied to
the issue. For example, Cook and Ludwig (2006), following the lead of Duggan
(2001), apply advanced methods to very detailed data, taking into consideration
many empirical problems.
I chose to revisit Cook and Ludwig (2006) (C&L hereafter) due to its rigor
and the detailed description of the data sources from a preceding working pa-
per (Cook and Ludwig 2004). The original objective was to address specialized
econometric problems, such as the noisy proxy used and truncation of the data
due to the logarithmic model, and to also possibly confirm the results with five
more years of data. In this attempt, I made a surprising discovery: C&L ignored a
statistical property of their data (ratios) leading to spurious results in regression
analysis. Even more surprising is that this pitfall has been known about for more
1A “shall-issue” law forces a state to issue concealed carry licenses to any applicant. No
reasons need to be given by the applicant; as long as he does not have any convictions or mental
disorders the license must be issued.
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than a century (Pearson 1896). This statistical property is the only reason C&L
arrived at their result, based on which they advocated taxing gun ownership.
To make educated and welfare-maximizing decisions, public planners often
rely on scientific findings. If these findings are biased or spurious, any public
policy based on themmay not have its intended effect and in the worst case could
actually be harmful. To some, it may be “obvious” that externalities are imposed
upon others by firearm possession. But even the “obvious” should be backed
up by evidence if public policies, not to mention public funds, are going to be
directed toward the issue and, unfortunately, C&L’s results are not appropriate
for this purpose. Their results are a statistical artifact of a well-known problem
in regression analysis. This is my main finding and it is demonstrated in detail
below. This work thus contributes to keeping spurious results out of the public
policy debate. Furthermore the problem is illustrated in enough detail that other
researchers may be alerted to this easy-to-miss problem and thus avoid it in their
own empirical analyses.
This paper is organized as follows: C&L’s original study is summarized and
put into scientific context in Section 2. Section 3 describes the acquisition of the
data necessary to repeat their analysis, and makes my analysis replicable by other
researchers. Indeed, only those readers interested in such a replication need read
Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. The results from Cook and Ludwig (2006) are repeated
in Sections 3.3 and 4.3, with a sharp twist in the results in Section 4.4 nullifying
C&L’s original conclusion. Section 5 then shows how the results from Cook and
Ludwig (2006) are spurious (mostly) due to ignoring the ratio fallacy – a problem
known since Pearson’s (1896) work and worked out in detail by Kronmal (1993).
This finding is confirmed via a battery of robustness checks in Section 6, some of
which also present possible fixes for the earlier model specification. None of the
models yield significance for the parameter of interest.
2 The Soial Costs of Gun Ownership
2.1 Summary
Cook and Ludwig (2006) appears to be a rigorous analysis of the relationship
between guns and crime. The authors use the advanced method of panel anal-
ysis and analyze a comprehensive data set covering 200 U.S. counties and 20
years. The results are presented in a clear fashion and a specific public policy
recommendation is made.
Framework: The analysis assumes that gun ownership may impose external-
ities on society (Cook and Ludwig 2006: 379–380), specifically that more guns
may result in more homicides.
Measures: Due to a lack of administrative data on gun ownership, a proxy
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is used. That proxy is the fraction of suicides committed with a firearm (Cook
and Ludwig 2006: 380), that is, “firearm suicides” divided by “suicides” (FSS or
FS/S). This proxy
(a) seems reasonable as in a society with zero guns, FSS will be zero, and in a
society where everyone has access to guns, all else equal, it very likely will
achieve its maximum value.
(b) is confirmed to function in the way intended by other studies (Azrael, Cook
and Miller 2004; Kleck 2004), at least for the cross-section.
(c) is supported by evidence that with increased availability of firearms the num-
ber of shooting suicides increases (see Klieve, Barnes andDe Leo 2009; Klieve,
Sveticic and De Leo 2009; Leenaars et al. 2003; Kellermann et al. 1992).
(d) continues to be valid if
i. other methods of suicide are substituted by firearms suicide (as sug-
gested by Klieve, Barnes and De Leo 2009) with increased availability
of guns, or
ii. the availability of guns increases the overall number of suicides through
suicides by shooting (for which there is some evidence; see Leenaars
et al. 2003; Klieve, Sveticic and De Leo 2009).2
For homicides, the numbers of homicides on the county level are used.
Data: The data used are a panel across the 200 U.S. counties with the largest
populations (measured in 1990) and for the period 1980 to 1999. Statistics on
population size and number of homicides and suicides, as well as some sociode-
mographic controls for each county, are available. From this information, a panel
of ratios is computed with the appropriate numerators and denominators.
Methods: The panel of ratios is analyzed by a two-way (individual and time)
fixed effects panel model on the logarithms. A variant of the estimating equation
with a full description of the variables used can be found in Section 4.1. Different
model specifications (different levels of aggregation, different sets of controls)
are compared.
Main Result: From the logarithmic model an elasticity of the homicide rate
with respect to the firearms ownership measure significant at the 5% level and
on the order of 0.10 is estimated. From this result, an appropriate tax on gun
ownership is calculated to be in the range of USD 100 to USD 1,800 depending
on the local levels of gun ownership and homicides.
2.2 Critiism
Moody and Marvell (2010) note that C&L switch their sets of controls in the
“crime equation” between Cook and Ludwig (2006), Cook and Ludwig (2002),
2I can find no literature discussing the case for no or a negative correlation between the
number of firearms and the number of suicides (or suicides by shooting).
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and Cook and Ludwig (2003) without giving any reasons for doing so. Kleck
(2009) has several criticisms, including (a) that C&L’s method of dealing with
causal dependence is overly simple, (b) that the FSS proxy may not be valid
for measuring trends in gun ownership, and, similar to Moody and Marvell’s
argument, (c) that the controls used are arbitrarily chosen and that some possible
necessary controls are missing from the model. This last criticism is valid, but
many sociodemographic controls can be substituted for each other and therefore
I do not consider such a change in control variables – possibly attributable to data
availability – to detract from the value of a study; also the fixed effects model
will be able to capture any unobserved variables that do not change over time.
Causality remains a problem and causal relationships have to be interpreted with
care. Indeed, finding an association but stopping short of calling it causality seems
prudent for the topic of guns and crime. Once an association is found, of course,
it is worth trying to discover causal relationships.
3 Data Aquisition
3.1 Data Soures and Extration
The aggregated data set used in Cook and Ludwig (2006) is not published and
the authors chose not to share it with me. I thus acquired the data from the
primary sources given in Cook and Ludwig (2004: Appendix 3). This allowed
me to include five more years of data. The four data sources used are:
1. CDC Wonder: I used the CDC Wonder database3 to obtain the yearly popu-
lation figure for the counties. This database was also used to select the 200
counties with the largest population in 19904 and the geographic FIPS codes
valid in 2009. CDC Wonder cannot be used to extract statistics on number of
homicides, firearm homicides, suicides, or firearm suicides as those numbers
are suppressed in the later years for many of the 200 counties.
2. Mortality Detail Data: Cook and Ludwig (2004: 45) list the exact data sources
used. These are ICPSR study data sets5 07632, 06798, 06799, 02201, 02392,
02702, 03085, 03306, 03473, 04640, 20540 and 20623, in chronological or-
der. Each of these data sets contains micro data for approximately 2 million
deaths in the United States for one year. No geographic codes are available
3United States Department of Health and Human Services (2010).
4The set of selected counties does not change if the 1990 census population from United
States Census Bureau (1990) is used instead.
5United States Department of Health and Human Services. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics (2010); United States
Department of Health and Human Services. National Center for Health Statistics
(1997, 2008a, b, 2009a, b, 2008c, 2007a, b, c, d, e)
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for 2005,6 and later data was not available to me.
3. Sociodemographic Controls: C&L had access to ICPSR study dataset 06054.7
This data set was not available to me. I used the 1980, 1990, and 2000 cen-
suses8 directly, with the code also available from Westphal (2013).
(a) For the 1980 census, data were extracted from the summary tape file 3C.
All data aggregated above or below county level were dropped. From
Table 1, total population and rural population (used to compute urban
population) are obtained. Table 10 gives the number of households. Table
12, cell 2 contains the number of blacks. Table 15, sum of cells 1–3 (males)
and 28–30 (females) gives the population younger than five years (used
to compute population aged five years and older). Table 20, cells 5–7
contains the number of female-headed households identifiable from the
census data.9 Table 34 contains the number of people who have been
living in the same house for five years or more.
(b) Summary tape file 3A was used for the 1990 census. The total population
is taken from Table P3; the respective number of households from P5. P6
gives the numbers of rural inhabitants. P8 contains the number of blacks.
The sum of P13’s first three cells yields the population below the age of
five years. P17, in cells 10 and 11, gives the number of female household
heads identifiable from this census. P43 contains the number of people
who have lived in the same house for five years or more.
(c) Summary file 3 for the 2000 census – downloadable at the county level
from the American Factfinder application10 – in Table P005, cell VD01
contains the figure for total population. The same table, cell VD05 gives
rural population. Table P006, cell VD03 yields the number of blacks. Ta-
ble P008, cells VD03 – VD07 (males) and VD42 – VD46 (females), are
the numbers of persons below five years of age. Table P009, cell VD21
contains the number of female-headed households identifiable from this
census. Table P014, cell VD01 contains the number of households.
4. Other Crime Data: The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports are available via ICPSR
study datasets11 08703, 08714, 09252, 09119, 09335, 09573, 09785, 06036,
6United States Department of Health and Human Services. National Center for Health Statis-
tics (2008d).
7United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census (1993).
8United States Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000). C&L did not name the 1980 census as a
data source in Cook and Ludwig (2004), but it is mentioned in Cook and Ludwig (2006: Table 1).
Relying only on the 1990 and 2000 censuses does not change any of the findings discussed below.
9The 2010 census gives the number of all female-headed households; it is remarkably higher
than the number identifiable from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
10For detailed download procedures see Westphal (2013).
11United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(2006a, b, r, 2005, 2006s, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q).
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06316, 06669, 06850, 02389, 02764, 02910, 03167, 03451, 03721, 04009,
04360 and 04466. These contain reported crime numbers aggregated at the
county level. Study dataset 0654512 for the 1993 Uniform Crime Report data
was not available for download at the time of writing.
For data extraction, I used R13 with Grothendieck (2011), the latter very conve-
niently allowing SQL operations on R data frames. For the mortality detail data,
the strategy is to read in the tab-separated file or fixed-width file for one year, and
then drop all deaths occurring in counties not on the list of the 200 counties men-
tioned above. Next, count homicides, firearm homicides, suicides, and firearm
suicides14 – coded by either ICD9 or ICD10 – by county using SQL ount().15
For the control variables and the other crime data, the data are already aggre-
gated at the county level. The controls have to be interpolated/extrapolated16
between/from the census years. The 2010 census was not used: the definition of
female-household head was changed for that census and the number of people
living in the same house for the last five years is missing from the 2010 summary
file.
Different geographical coding schemes are found in the data: NCHS17 cod-
ing and FIPS18 coding. NCHS coding changes with each census and FIPS coding
changes as counties are renamed or restructured. Changes relevant to the 200
largest counties between 1979 and 2004 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. These
changes may lead to mismatched assignment of values if ignored during data ex-
traction; thus each data source and each year had to be individually checked for
such changes. There are many potential sources of error here. Detailed instruc-
tions and all code used can be found on my personal website (Westphal 2013)
for individual use and critical review. To replicate Cook and Ludwig (2006), the
five New York City counties are aggregated into one artificial county.19
3.2 Resulting Dataset
The resulting dataset shows 24 variables for K = 196 counties in T = 26 years
(1979-2004). These variables include five index variables, namely, year as a time
12United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2008).
13R Development Core Team (2011).
14This includes homicides and suicides by explosives as these are not distinguishable in ICD9
coding.
15The numbers extracted this way were confirmed using the Stata files provided by ICPSR and
repeating the data extraction using independent Stata code, also available fromWestphal (2013).
16I used linear interpolation.
17National Center for Health Statistics.
18Federal Information Processing Standard.
19I assigned a “FIPS” code of 36998 to that artificial county.
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State County NCHS 1970 NCHS 1980 FIPS 6-5 2009
Missouri St. Louis City 26096 26097 29510
Missouri St. Louis County 26095 26096 29189
Nevada Clarc County 29002 29003 32003
New York Kings County 33029 33029 36047
New York Queens County 33029 33029 36081
New York New York County 33029 33029 36061
New York Bronx County 33029 33029 36005
New York Richmond County 33029 33029 36085
Virginia Norfolk City 47369 47088 51710
Virginia Virginia Beach City 47402 47127 51810
Virginia Fairfax County 47087 47040 51059
Table 1: NCHS code changes between 1970 and 1980 according to
ht tp : //www.nber.or g/mor tal i t y/er rata.t x t
Change notice Year Affects (out of 200 largest counties in 1990)
2 1992 none
3 1995 none
4 1999 none
5 1999
Dade County, FL changed its name to Miami-Dade
County, FL. FIPS changed from 12025 to 12086.
6 2002
Parts of Adams County, CO and Jefferson County,
CO now are part of Broomfield County, CO.
7 2001 none
8 2007 none
9 2008 none
10 2008 none
Table 2: FIPS 6-5 changes affecting the 200 largest counties in 1990 according
to ht tp : //www.census.gov/geo/www/ansi/changenotes.html
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index, and nchs and fips, and the tuple of state and county as interchangeable
individual identifiers for the counties.
There are population numbers (per county, per year):
(1) pop: the population number from United States Department of Health and
Human Services (2010),
(2) total: the (interpolated) population number from the censuses,
(3) UCRpop: the population number from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report,
(4) total5plus: the (interpolated) population number from the census for persons
of five years and older,
(5) households: the (interpolated) number of households from the censuses,
(6) deaths: the number of all deaths (not used).
There are four numbers involving homicides and suicides (variables named
by the respective ICD9 code):
(1) E96: homicides,
(2) E965: firearm homicides,
(3) E95: suicides,
(4) E955: firearm suicides.
The remaining nine variables are control variables:
(1) resid5Yago: number of residents not having moved in the last five years,
(2) rural: number of residents living in rural areas,
(3) black: number of black residents,
(4) fhh: number of female household heads,
(5) UCRmurder: number of murders from the UCR (not used),
(6) UCRrape: number of rapes from the UCR (not used),
(7) UCRrobbery: number of robberies from the UCR,
(8) UCRassault: number of assaults from the UCR (not used),
(9) UCRburglary: number of burglaries from the UCR.
I then used these numbers to calculate the percentages with the appropriate
denominator. Usually, the denominator is pop except for the ratio of people not
having moved in the last five years (denominator is total5plus) and the ratio of
female household heads, where the denominator is the number of households.
Switching the denominator to either total or UCRpop changes the results only
marginally from those reported below; correlation between pop and total is
> 0.999 and correlation between pop and UCRpop is > 0.989.
3.3 Comparison of Desriptives
There are detailed descriptives in Cook and Ludwig (2006: 382 and Table 1). I
compare my data to those aggregates. The values computed from my dataset
are found in Tables 3 and 4, with the values from the original article in paren-
theses. To avoid comparing different time periods, I restricted the comparison of
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descriptives to 1980–1999, the years used in the original study.
% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Quantile
4 28 35 41 47 55 65 80 106 156 1156
(NA) (27) (NA) (NA) (NA) (52) (NA) (NA) (NA) (142) (NA)
Table 3: Quantiles of number of suicides for the 200 largest counties over 1980
to 1999, values from Cook and Ludwig (2006) in parentheses
C&L (p. 383) give all values “weighted by county population”. This does not
make any sense for values whose denominator is not county population. There-
fore, I added a column weight to Table 4. This column allows comparing my data
to those of C&L while at the same time giving the correct descriptives. Indiscrim-
inately weighting by county population will not result in the sample mean if the
variable does not have county population as a denominator. For example, for the
average number of suicides per county in
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
E95k,t popk,t
KT pop
6= E95, (1)
where, from now on, k is the county index and t is the time index.
Note that the descriptives from Cook and Ludwig (2006: Table 1) and those
from my dataset are very similar. Differences may be due to slightly different
data sources,20 a slightly different set of observations used for computation,21 or,
possibly, revised data.
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 Model
C&L used the logarithmic two-way fixed effects model with t = 1,2, . . . , T indi-
cating the years and k = 1,2, . . . ,K indicating the counties:
lnYk,t = β1 ln FSSk,t−1 + Xk,tβ2 + dk + dt + ǫk,t . (2)
Xk,t contains the logarithmic values of the ratios used as controls, namely, (i) bur-
glary rate, (ii) robbery rate, (iii) percentage black, (iv) percentage urban, (v) per-
centage 5+ year residents and (vi) percentage female-headed households. They
include the proxy FSS = E955/E95 lagged by one year to circumvent possible re-
verse causation, i.e., people buying guns because of a higher homicide rate. The
20Remember, I had no access to the ICPSR study files on the censuses.
21I do not know if the values from Cook and Ludwig (2006) are calculated on the full data set
or on their selection of 3,822 observations used for the regression analysis.
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weight
Full sample Bottom quartile Top quartile
(largest 200) 1980 FSS 1980 FSS
Full period
(1980-1999)
FSS
E95 52.47 35.80 66.38
pop 49.98 34.54 66.18
pop (49.9) (34.6) (66.9)
Homicide rate pop 11.30 11.00 14.27
per 100’000 pop (11.0) (10.9) (14.4)
Gun homicide rate pop 7.46 6.92 9.93
per 100’000 pop (7.3) (6.9) (10.1)
% Urban
pop 93.68 95.14 92.66
pop (92.6) (94.7) (91.8)
% Black
pop 14.33 16.75 18.64
pop (14.0) (13.5) (19.5)
% not moved
total5plus 57.76 59.43 48.35
in last 5 years
% Female houshold
households 17.36 18.60 16.40
head
pop 17.18 18.40 16.28
pop (18.0) (20.1) (18.5)
Burglary rate pop 1339 1218 1643
Robbery rate pop 319 415 291
Avg. # Suicides
1 83.43 80.69 78.97
per county
pop 194.17 193.50 123.30
pop (195.8) (192.5) (120.0)
FSS in selected years
1980
E95 49.91 29.28 72.72
pop 48.01 29.20 73.11
pop (48.0) (29.2) (73.3)
1990
E95 54.93 37.87 68.36
pop 52.57 36.78 68.48
pop (52.8) (37.2) (69.1)
1999
E95 50.56 35.71 60.01
pop 48.18 34.93 59.81
pop (48.0) (34.9) (59.8)
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for county data revisited, values from Cook and
Ludwig (2006: Table 1) in parentheses
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dependent variable Y is the homicide rate E96/pop. Results for this and those
in the following sections are qualitatively the same when the rate of firearms
homicides E965/pop is used. Results may be found at Westphal (2013). In their
model, they include another constant term, β0, but as we know this is either
caught in the time and county dummies, or the model is overspecified, or we
need to impose a restriction on one set of dummies22, so I do not include it in in
Equation (2).
4.2 Data for Analysis
Ratios taking a value of zero have to be excluded from the analysis as their log-
arithm is −∞. There are several ways of excluding observations containing a
ratio of zero: unbalance the panel or remove counties or years (whichever is less
costly) in order to keep the panel balanced. For the remainder of this article I
present results from a balanced panel. All observations from 1993 are removed
as 1993 UCR data23 were not available at the time of writing. I also removed all
counties having a zero in either of the ratios’ numerators (see Table 4). Results
for this and those presented in the following sections are qualitatively the same
and numerically close when using (various subsets of) the unbalanced panel.24
The resulting balanced panel is 25 years long (1979 to 2004 without 1993) and
142 counties wide, i.e. there are 3,550 observations. Descriptive statistics do not
differ much from those set out in Table 4. From those values, rates, logarithms of
rates, and lagged values for FSS are added to the dataset; 3,408 values remain
for 1980 to 2004 after balancing on the lags and differences.
4.3 Conrming results
Estimating Equation (2) from this balanced panel yields the estimation output
in Table 5, column labeled “Equation (2)”. The results are only slightly different
from the results in Cook and Ludwig (2006: Table 2, final column). The sample
used is different (five more years and balanced) and I did not apply weighting
on the panel model, as this is rarely done in the econometric literature. The lack
of efficiency can be dealt with after estimation by applying Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) via Croissant and Millo’s (2008) vovSCC function.25 Contrary to Cook
22An example would be
∑
k dk = 0.
23United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2008).
24For the unbalanced panel weighting as used by C&L is needed to achieve significance. All
results may be found at Westphal (2013).
25By applying weighting to account for heteroscedasticity (Cook and Ludwig 2006: 382) and
calculating standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity (Cook and Ludwig 2006: 382),
C&L basically “double correct” for heteroscedasticity. I did not find any econometric literature on
this approach; however their weighting may be viewed as easily justifiable “importance weight-
ing”.
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Years 1980-1999 1980-2004
Estimates Equation (2) Equation (3)
by C&L fixed effects first differences
N = 3822 N = 3408 N = 3266
Explanatories Coef. Coef. SE Coef. p-val
ln FSSt−1 0.086
∗ 0.074∗ 0.029 0.011 0.67
ln robbery rate 0.149∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.042 0.028 0.38
ln burglary rate 0.226∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.033 0.020 0.67
ln % black 0.278† 0.141∗∗ 0.050 −0.071 0.80
ln % urban −0.537∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗ 0.160 −0.319 0.77
ln % same house 5 yr ago −0.690 −0.467∗ 0.235 −0.045 0.96
ln % female headed house −0.303 0.650∗∗∗ 0.186 0.914 0.31
R2
within
NA 0.060 0.001
Table 5: Estimation output, † : p < 0.10, ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ : p <
0.001, robust standard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) computed
with vovSCC from Croissant and Millo (2008), R2 adjusted
and Ludwig (2006: Table 3, model 3), who needed weighting to achieve signifi-
cance on β1, significance on the balanced panel is achieved without weighting.
26
This may be due to the large errors in the proxy, as noted by Cook and Ludwig
(2006: 382), which bias the coefficient towards zero. Balancing the panel by ex-
cluding zeroes favors counties with less error in the proxy, that is, larger counties
in terms of population, which therefore, all else equal, have a lesser chance of
producing zeroes, are favored by the balanced panel.
The within R2 reported in Table 5 is magnitudes smaller than the R2 of around
0.9 reported by Cook and Ludwig (2006: Table 2) for all their models. They re-
ported the R2 from the least squares dummy variable estimation. That measure
includes the fit from the dummies. The within R2 only includes the fit from the
ratios in Xk,t and FSSk,t−1. This tells us that much of the variation comes from re-
gional and/or intertemporal differences, caught by the dummies. The coefficient
on the female household heads changes sign between the original study and my
estimation, but this does not affect the arguments in Sections 4.4, 5 or 6. For
β1, we can say the significant positive result from Cook and Ludwig (2006) is
confirmed by my estimation.
26Notably despite having used the same data sources I cannot exactly replicate the results from
Cook and Ludwig (2006). The following data have been updated since their work, but exactly
what changes were made is not known: United States Department of Health and Human Services.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics (2010: data sets
27, 28, 29).
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4.4 Estimation on First Dierenes
Model (2) can be reformulated on the first differences, as is well known from
reading any econometric textbook on panel analysis (e.g., Wooldridge 2002: Sec-
tion 10.6). The individual fixed effects disappear from the model, the time fixed
effects are transformed to the differences between the time fixed effects, and the
errors are transformed.27 The coefficients on the variables of interest remain the
same mathematically, as can be seen from Equation (3).
∆ lnYk,t = lnYk,t − lnYk,t−1
∆ lnYk,t = β1∆ ln FSSk,t−1 +∆Xk,tβ2 +δt + νk,t
(3)
Therefore, when estimating Equation (3) we would expect similar results in size
and significance as achieved from estimating Equation (2). Looking at Table 5
reveals that all significance has disappeared from the model. This will be discussed
in the next section.
5 Disussion
5.1 Ratio Fallay
To understand what happens when we estimate the first difference model, the
estimating equation (2) needs to be written out in full. In a first step we obtain:
lnHomRk,t = β1 ln FSSk,t−1 + β2,1 lnBur gRk,t + β2,2 lnRobRk,t
+ β2,3 lnBlackRk,t + β2,4 lnUrbRk,t + β2,5 lnResid5Rk,t
+ β2,6 ln FHHRk,t + dk + dt + ǫk,t (4)
This equation still contains ratios, so it has to be written on the counts, yielding
ln E96k,t − lnpopk,t = β1(ln E955k,t − lnE95k,t)
+ β2,1(ln bur glariesk,t − lnpopk,t) + β2,2(ln robberiesk,t − lnpopk,t)
+ β2,3(ln blacksk,t − lnpopk,t) + β2,4(lnur bansk,t − lnpopk,t)
+ β2,5(ln5yearResidentsk,t − lnpop5plusk,t)
+ β2,6(ln f hhk,t − lnhouseholdsk,t) + dk + dt + ǫk,t . (5)
One of the left-hand summands – lnpopk,t – repeats itself multiple times on the
right-hand side. Basically, this model explains “population plus homicides” on
the left-hand side by six different “population + something” terms on the right-
hand side. Population is a perfect correlate of itself,28 so as long as the added
27For when this is beneficial, see Wooldridge (2002: Section 10.7).
28It is nearly perfectly correlated with the population of those five years and older and the
number of households; r > 0.99 for those variables.
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values do not exhibit too much orthogonal variation to population itself, it will
be able to explain itself. This is a variant of the ratio fallacy, first discovered by
Pearson (1896) and discussed in detail by Kronmal (1993),29 which here appears
disguised in a logarithmic model. This fallacy can be seen more clearly in the
logarithms of ratios, as now the variable responsible for the spurious results is
linear in the terms on both sides. The FSS denominator is the number of all
suicides (E95), i.e., it is not population. Why this does not affect the argument
is shown in Section 5.3.
5.2 First Dierenes
I now demonstrate what happens when we compute the first differences of any
of the ratios’ logarithms using the example of the left-hand side of Equation (6)
to understand why significance vanishes here.
∆Yk,t =∆(ln E96k,t − ln popk,t )
= (ln E96k,t − ln popk,t )− (ln E96k,t−1 − ln popk,t−1)
= ln E96k,t − ln popk,t − ln E96k,t−1 + ln popk,t−1
= ln
E96k,t
E96k,t−1
− ln
popk,t
popk,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆ ln popk,t−1≈0
(6)
Population changes relatively the slowest over time compared to the other val-
ues. Therefore, the second fraction is always very close to 1, meaning that the
logarithm is always very close to 0. This is shown in Table 6 when comparing
(i) the values on the diagonal and (ii) their (rescaled) squared deviations from
zero (see the bottom row): the diagonal tells us∆ ln pop has much less variation
than any other value and the bottom shows us that the values on average are
much closer to zero than all other values. Around sixty percent of the variance in
the value based on population ∆ ln popk,t is variance between counties.
30 Close
to 100% of all variance in all other values in Table 6 is variance within counties
(over time).31 Together with Table 6 this shows that all other values vary much
more strongly over time than does the value based on population. Relative to the
other values, the logarithm of the growth rate of the population can be consid-
ered constant, as it is depicted in Equation (6). Also, for the right-hand side term
29Further ample warning about these specifications is given in the methodological literature:
Kuh and Meyer (1955); Madansky (1964); Belsley (1972); Casson (1973).
30Computed by analysis of variance decomposition of variance: within-county variance is vari-
ance over time, between-county variance is variance between counties.
31Actually, an analysis of variance decomposition shows negative between variance for
E95, E955, and E96, which is rare but numerically possible and evidence for very low between
variance.
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of interest β1(∆ ln E955k,t−1−∆ ln E95k,t−1), the term from the numerator is dou-
ble the mean squared distance from zero and double the variance than the term
from the denominator. This means that in this specific data set, taking the first
differences at least partially removes the numbers causing spurious correlations
between ratios. This does not mean, however, that taking first differences will
solve this problem any time in any data set. Here, it basically removes population
∆ ln pop ∆ ln E96 ∆ ln E95t−1 ∆ ln E955t−1
∆ ln pop 1.00 0.92 0.69 0.47
∆ ln E96 0.92 450.92 −0.22 2.81
∆ ln E95t−1 0.69 −0.22 172.24 171.21
∆ ln E955t−1 0.47 2.81 171.21 356.52
rescaled mean
sum of squares 1.00 289.19 111.32 230.42
Table 6: Covariance matrix rescaled by s2
∆ ln pop = 0.0002409870, mean sums of
squares rescaled by K−1T−1
∑
k
∑
t(∆ ln popk,t)
2 = 0.0003727771
from all the terms and only the (growth rates) of the numerators remain in the
model after taking first differences. Once population is removed from both sides,
the right-hand side is no longer able to explain the left hand-side.
5.3 But E95 is Not Population
One could now argue E95k,t−1 is not population and therefore the results from
Cook and Ludwig (2006) are not due to the ratio fallacy. When we look at the
correlation matrix (Table 7) we immediately see that the correlation between
suicides and population is far superior to any other correlation between the left-
hand side and the right-hand side, at least in regard to the four variables shown
in Table 7. Auxiliary panel regression results in Table 8 support the claim that it
ln pop ln E96 ln E95t−1 ln E955t−1
ln pop 1.000 0.676 0.868 0.685
ln E96 0.676 1.000 0.731 0.705
ln E95t−1 0.868 0.731 1.000 0.902
ln E955t−1 0.685 0.705 0.902 1.000
Table 7: Correlation matrix of population and different deaths
is E95 driving the results of the coefficient on the FSS proxy.
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Exogenous variable
Dependent variable ln E95k,t−1 ln E955k,t−1 R
2
within
ln popk,t 0.24
∗∗∗ (0.047) −0.05∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.15
ln E96k,t 0.20
∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.03 (0.029) 0.02
Table 8: Auxiliary two-way fixed effects panel regressions illustrating the explana-
tory power of the FSS denominator in the model, ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ :
p < 0.001, robust standard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) com-
puted with vovSCC from Croissant andMillo (2008) in parentheses, R2 adjusted
5.4 Nonsense Regression Between Time Series
Regression between time series is known to produce spurious results in the fol-
lowing settings: trending or auto correlated time series (Granger and Newbold
1974), I(1) processes without drift (Phillips 1986), I(1) processes with further
stationary regressors (Hassler 1996), stationary AR processes (Granger, Hyung
and Jeon 2001), randomwalks with and without drift for fixed effects panel mod-
els (Entorf 1997), time-varying means (Hassler 2003), and stationary processes
around linear trends (Kim, Lee and Newbold 2004), as well as in fixed effects
(or first differences) estimations with weak variation in the time series (Choi
2011). It seems unlikely that none of these situations occurred in the original
analysis, and thus there may be more sources for spurious results than just the
ratio problem. As noted by C&L themselves (p. 383), there are heterogeneous
trends for the dependent variable between counties. This is illustrated in Figure
1. Clearly, a single time dummy is incapable of detrending heterogeneous trends
across counties. Therefore, not all trends will be accounted for in C&L’s original
model. Many of those time-series-related problems are automatically dealt with
when taking first differences, while the single time dummy from model (2) is not
able to detrend heterogeneous county trends.
5.5 Misspeiation of the Original Model
5.5.1 Testing for Misspeiation
We can look at the problem in C&L’s model from the perspective of linear model
theory. When we write out Equation (2) and rearrange the right-hand side of
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Figure 1: Illustration of heterogeneous time trends of the homicide rate between
counties.
Equatin (7), we obtain
lnHomRk,t = β1(ln E955k,t−1 − ln E95k,t−1)
+ β2,1(ln bur glariesk,t − ln popk,t) . . .
= βE955 ln E955k,t−1 + βE95 ln E95k,t−1) + β2,1 ln bur glariesk,t + . . .
+ (−β2,1 − β2,2 − β2,3 − β2,4 − β2,5 − β2,6)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βpop
ln popk,t + ǫk,t .
(7)
We see a linear restriction of
βE955 + βE95
β2,1 + β2,2 + β2,3 + β2,4 + β2,5 + β2,6 + βpop

=

0
0

, (8)
which is rejected with a p-value of 5.372×10−14. The number of households and
the population of those five years and older are substituted for by population, as
these are nearly perfect correlates.32 Therefore, the original model seems to be
misspecified. When estimation is performed on the first differences, the same
restriction as in Equation (8) has to hold. In this case, the null hypothesis is not
rejected (p-value of 0.90). This is further evidence that the differentiated model
has in this case taken the ratio problem out of the data. However, this does not
have to be the case for any dataset.
32Using the original denominators and testing all four linear hypotheses leads to an even more
significant rejection of the null hypothesis.
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5.5.2 Theoretial Bias
For a simple univariate linear model33 on logarithms of ratios with a common
denominator
ln y j − ln z j = b0 + b1(ln x j − ln z j) + ǫ j (9)
⇔ ln y j − ln z j = b0 + bx ln x j + bz ln z j + ǫ j with bx = −bz (10)
with j = 1,2, . . . , J and a linear restriction of bx + bz = 0 in Equation (10), the
bias of the estimator of bx = b1 can be computed. The bias is known (see Judge
et al. 1985: 53, Eq. (3.2.6)) to be
(G′G)−1R′[R(G′G)−1R′]−1(r − Rb) (11)
where G =

1J lnX ln Z

is the usual matrix of independent variables in the
least squares model and 1J , lnX and ln Z are column vectors of 1s, the ln x j, and
the ln z j. R and r describe the linear restriction

0 1 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=R
×

b0bx
bz


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b
= [0]︸︷︷︸
=r
. (12)
Using
(G′G)−1 =

c1,1 c1,2 c1,3c1,2 c2,2 c2,3
c1,3 c2,3 c3,3

 (13)
the bias for bˆx given bx = 0 can then be calculated:
bias(bˆx |bx = 0) = −
c2,2 + c2,3
c2,2 + 2c2,3 + c3,3
bz. (14)
Considering all cv,w have the same denominator det(G
′G), the fraction in Equa-
tion (14) becomes
−
J
∑
z∗2 − (
∑
z∗)2 + J
∑
x∗z∗ −
∑
x∗
∑
z∗
J
∑
z∗2 − (
∑
z∗)2 + 2(J
∑
x∗z∗ −
∑
x∗
∑
z∗) + J
∑
x∗2 − (
∑
x∗)2
(15)
33I use different symbols here so as not to mislead the reader into thinking this is the same
model as Equation (2). Furthermore the result can be directly applied to panel estimation. This
can be seen from the appropriate transformations (e.g. Baltagi 2008: Sections 2.2, 3.2).
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with z∗
j
= ln z j, x
∗
j
= ln x j, and where each sum is on all j and the index has been
omitted for readability. This, expanded by J−2 collapses to
F = −
s2
z∗
+ sx∗,z∗
s2
z∗
+ 2sx∗,z∗ + s
2
x∗
(16)
giving the overall expected bias of bx = b1 as F bz solely depending on the vari-
ances and covariance of lnX , ln Z and the true bz. This result is well in accordance
with an upward biased estimate of β1 in C&L’s original model. Furthermore the
implications are quite strong: If neither X nor Z contribute to the outcome Y and
all variables are uncorrelated, then bz takes a value of −1 and from estimating
the restricted Model (9) we expect a positive estimate for b1.
6 Alternative speiations
6.1 Controlling for Population
The first method for removing the spuriousness from C&L’s model is given by Kro-
nmal (1993: 390): include the inverse of the deflating variable as an explanatory
variable on the right-hand side. In a logarithmic model, this means we can just
add the logarithm of the deflating variable.34 The model then becomes35
lnYk,t = β0 ln popk,t + β1 ln FSSk,t−1 + Xk,tβ2 + dk + dt + ǫk,t. (17)
The estimation result from this model is set out in the column labeled “Eq. (17)”
in Table 9. Across the board, significance weakens considerably and completely
disappears from the ratios computed from the best correlates of population in
the numerator. This specification takes out the linear restriction on ln pop known
from Equations (7) and (8). The linear restriction in (8) is now less restrictive:
βln E955k,t−1 + βln E95k,t−1 = 0. (18)
The p-value for this null hypothesis is 0.002195. This still does not account for
possibly spurious results due to time-series effects. It is likely that not all the
left-hand side time series in the panel can be detrended by a single time dummy.
Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 discuss further model specifications.
34I know of only one other study on this topic that explicitly addresses this technique: Kleck
and Patterson (1993).
35I use ǫk,t for the error term multiple times in this section; however, I do not assume it to be
identically distributed for all models. Also I reuse β for coefficients with different interpretations.
These are not identical across models.
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Underlying
Model
explanatories
Eq. (17) Eq. (19) Eq. (24) Eq. (26)
controlling rearranged risk growth
population −0.48 1.00 −0.000 1.079
(0.000) (restr.) (0.592) (0.198)
suicide measures
FSSt−1 0.05 0.02 NA NA
(0.082) (0.516)
other suicidest−1 NA NA 0.120 −0.012
(0.196) (0.784)
firearms suicidest−1 NA NA 0.017 −0.001
(0.781) (0.979)
control variables
robberies 0.13 0.16 0.002 0.028
(0.002) (0.001) (0.295) (0.547)
burglaries 0.10 0.08 0.005 0.020
(0.005) (0.076) (0.000) (0.677)
blacks 0.19 0.24 0.001 −0.067
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.841)
urbans −0.18 0.15 0.000 −0.210
(0.314) (0.477) (0.238) (0.854)
same house 5 years ago −0.11 0.29 −0.000 −0.349
(0.645) (0.231) (0.287) (0.603)
female headed house 0.33 −0.02 −0.002 0.410
(0.089) (0.928) 0.220 (0.371)
R2
within
0.075 0.058 0.200 0.002
Table 9: Robustness of the null result to different model specifications eliminating
the ratio fallacy. Cells give coefficient estimates and corresponding p-values in
parentheses. Robust standard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) were
computed with vovSCC from Croissant and Millo (2008) for significance levels,
R2 adjusted
6 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 21
6.2 Algebrai Transformation of the Estimating Equation
Similar to the approach in Section 6.1 one may transform Equation (5) by adding
ln popk,t on both sides. This results in
ln E96k,t = ln popk,t + β1 ln FSSk,t−1 + Xk,tβ2 + dk + dt + ǫk,t . (19)
ln popk,t now has a fixed coefficient of βpop = 1. This technique is known from
the Poisson regression model for the analysis of rates.36 Any spurious correlation
between the left-hand side and the right-hand side due to population appearing
on both sides is no longer possible. Results are reported in the column labeled
“Eq. (19)” in Table 9. There is no significance on FSSt−1. Testing solely for the
restriction βpop = 1 rejects the null hypotheses.
37 Therefore the model appears
to be misspecified. Time series problems are not accounted for.
6.3 Risk Model
Duggan (2003: 48–50) proposes a model38 for explaining individual i’s suicide
decision39
Pr(Suicidei) = α+ X iθ + γGuni + λi + ǫi (20)
with X i being individual observable controls, Guni a dummy for gun ownership,
andλi individual i’s unobserved individual propensity to commit suicide. Assume
that a gun owner chooses suicide by firearm with a probability> 0. Then, as long
as λi is not negatively correlated with gun ownership and as long as γ ≥ 0, gun
ownership will be associated with a higher probability of committing suicide at
all or just with a higher probability of committing suicide by firearm.40 For the
limiting case of zero correlation between Guni and λi the relative risk of a gun
owner becomes:41
RRGun =
α+ X iθ + γGuni + ǫi
α+ X iθ + ǫi
≥ 1 (21)
and the expected number of (firearm) suicides for a population of size pop will
be
E [E95] = pop · (α+ Xθ + γ · Pr(Gun)), (22)
E [E955] = pop · Pr(GunSuic|Suicide,Gun) · Pr(Suicide|Gun) · Pr(Gun) (23)
36See Osgood (2000: 23–27).
37p-value of 8.22× 10−12.
38I slightly deviate from Duggan’s notation without changing the model to keep my formulas
simpler.
39This is a linear probability model. The parameters must satisfy the requirement of 0 ≤
Pr(Suicidei)≤ 1∀i. The following argument holds for other monotonous link functions as well.
40∂ Pr(GunSuici |Suicidei)/∂ Guni > 0.
41There is no evidence in the literature contradicting these assumptions.
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under the simplifying assumption that only gun owners are able to commit suicide
by firearm. When the X i are dummies, pop · X will become count data for those
dummies (that is, numbers of people with certain characteristics). The relative
risk notion in Equation (21) gives a very clear interpretation to the coefficients
in this model.
I go in the opposite direction, and start at the macro level by proposing a “risk
model” (coefficients do not match the identically named coefficients in equations
(20), (21) and (22)) for homicides that can be estimated solely on differences in
the counts, thus removing the potential for spuriousness due to time series:
∆E96k,t = β0∆popk,t+β1,1∆E955k,t−1+β1,2∆E95k,t−1+∆Xk,tβ2+δt+ǫk,t , (24)
where Xk,t now contains the numerators’ values of the control ratios used by C&L.
E955k,t−1 now is the gun proxy – which, given Duggan’s (2003) model, should
be positively correlated to the number of gun owners – and the number of non-
firearm suicides is used as an additional control. Then β1,1 should be positive if
crime increases with more guns. Let us say β0 is one person’s baseline risk of
becoming a victim/committing a homicide. Now attribute an additional risk to
each gun owner,42 then a relation of
β0 + β1,1
β0
∼ RRgunowner, (25)
exists, given the number of firearm suicides is somehow linked to the number
of gun owners. Results are reported in the column labeled “Eq. (24)” of Table
9. There is no significance on the variable of interest (E955). Significance on
the other variables must not be over interpreted. For example, for burglaries, it
might just mean there are around 170 times as many burglaries as homicides.
This model is susceptible to criticism for obvious heteroscedasticity across coun-
ties with different levels of population. Standardization would be helpful. Also
multicollinearity might be an issue, as all numbers used are part of the population
and therefore are in popk,t .
6.4 Growth Model
A way to standardize without using ratios is to use growth rates. Putting the (log-
arithm of) the growth rate of homicides on the left-hand side yields the following
model:
ln
E96k,t
E96k,t−1
= β0 ln
popk,t
popk,t−1
+ β1 ln
E955k,t−1
E955k,t−2
+ Xk,tβ2 + ǫk,t , (26)
42Either as a victim or as the perpetrator or by imposing an externality upon the remaining
population.
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where Xk,t contains the log growth rates for the controls. As in the risk model,
non-firearm suicides can be added as a control. Results are reported in the col-
umn labeled “Eq. (26)” in Table 9; no significance is observed.43
6.5 Numerators and Denominators
To check where the explanatory power in C&L’s model comes from, a comparison
of the following models seems appropriate:
ln popk,t = β1 ln E95k,t−1 + dk + dt + ǫk,t (27)
ln popk,t = β1 ln E955k,t−1 + β2,1 ln bur glariesk,t + β2,2 ln robberiesk,t
+ β2,3 ln blacksk,t + β2,4 lnur bansk,t + β2,5 ln5yearResidentsk,t
+ β2,6 ln f hhk,t + dk + dt + ǫk,t.
(28)
ln E96k,t = β1 ln E95k,t−1 + β3 ln popk,t + dk + dt + ǫk,t (29)
ln E96k,t = β1 ln E955k,t−1 + β2,1 ln bur glariesk,t + β2,2 ln robberiesk,t
+ β2,3 ln blacksk,t + β2,4 lnur bansk,t + β2,5 ln5yearResidentsk,t
+ β2,6 ln f hhk,t + dk + dt + ǫk,t.
(30)
These models allow cross-checking whether the right-hand side numerators ac-
tually explain the left-hand side numerator as intended, or whether some other
mechanism is driving the results. In Equation (27) there is only one right-hand
side term. Due to nearly perfect correlation with pop−1
k,t , I removed pop5plus
−1
k,t
and households−1
k,t from the model. Including pop
−1
k,t on the right-hand side is obvi-
ously ridiculous. The results are given in Table 10. The comparison of within R2s
Model
lhs: pop lhs: E96
Equation (27) Equation (28) Equation (29) Equation (30)
R2
within
0.1492 0.9542 0.0322 0.0818
Modifications of equation (28)
lhs: pop lhs: E96/pop
rhs only numerators ratios only numerators ratios
R2
within
0.9542 0.2790 0.0810 0.0635
Table 10: Diagnostics for finding the source of “explanatory power” in the original
model, R2 adjusted
clearly shows that Equations (27) and (28) each display a larger coefficient of de-
termination than either Equation (29) or Equation (30). The very high within R2
43For state-level data, this model yields a negative coefficient on the order of 0.3 on the gun
proxy, significant at the 5% level. This is the only setting showing this result.
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of 0.9542 for Equation (28) reduces to 0.0810 when the left-hand side is changed
to E96/pop, to 0.2790 when the right-hand side is changed to ratios, and, finally,
to 0.06 when lhs and rhs are changed to the full model from Equation (2) (Ta-
ble 10, second row). Thus, from a goodness-of-fit point of view, the only thing
C&L’s full model does, is add a lot of noise to Equation (28). This adds additional
support to the already strong theoretical and quantitative argument in Section
5 that the results of the original analysis were driven by the ratio fallacy. The
coefficients of these estimations have no useful interpretation; this was purely an
illustrative exercise to show what is driving the results in the original paper.
7 Conlusion
Other aspects of C&L’s analysis could be addressed. Namely, (i) their data suffer
from truncation for observations with zeroes in the numerators44 and (ii) the FSS
proxy is very noisy for smaller counties: Imagine a county in year t − 1 having
20 suicides, one with a gun, and in t 20 suicides, eight with guns.45 Surely gun
ownership did not increase proportional to this increase in FSS. This problem
could be addressed by using moving averages.46 However, as their results are
purely an effect of a technical property of the data, further criticism of the study
seems unwarranted. Which model should they have chosen? This remains an
open question but given that none yields significance or anything close to it for
the parameter of interest, finding the “correct” model becomes somewhat of a
moot point. Of much more relevance, especially when it comes to the sensitive
topic of gun control, is to discover how many studies on this topic have ignored
the ratio problem?
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The Social Costs of Gun Ownership Revisited 
 
 
Abstract 
Cook and Ludwig (2006) use data on homicide rates and gun prevalence proxies from U.S. 
counties over the period 1980–1999 and, in their panel data analysis, find a positive and 
statistically significant association between both variables. We reexamine their analysis and 
show that their findings are driven by spurious correlations arising from the use of a common 
denominator (ratio fallacy) to deflate both dependent and independent variables as well as 
unaccounted county- level time trends. When we attempt to replicate their results accounting 
for these issues, we no longer find any evidence that gun ownership is linked to homicides. 
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1. Introduction 
Scientific research is become an increasingly important component of the gun debate in the 
United States (see, e.g., Fox and McDowall, 2008). In an influential paper, Cook and Ludwig 
(2006; C&L hereafter) find a significantly positive relationship between gun prevalence and 
homicides in a panel data analysis based on U.S. counties for the period from 1980 to 1999. 
They conclude that “an increase in gun prevalence causes an intensification of criminal 
violence—a shift toward greater lethality, and hence greater harm to the community” (Cook 
and Ludwig, 2006: 387). This study has been used as evidence in favor of gun control (Cook 
et al., 2008: Part I; Leigh and Neill, 2010: 514).  
We argue that C&L’s analysis suffers from a spurious correlation problem arising out of the 
use of ratios with common (or highly correlated) denominators on both sides of the regression 
equation (ratio fallacy). Moreover, their failure to account for county- level time trends is 
potentially problematic. In Section 2 of this comment, we conceptually explain the fallacies 
involved in C&L’s empirical approach. Section 3 is concerned with replicating their results 
and Section 4 addresses the potential spurious correlation issue. Our empirical findings 
suggest that C&L’s results are indeed spurious and that no policy recommendations involving 
gun control should be made based on their dataset. 
 
2. Reconsidering Cook’s and Ludwig’s Approach 
In their paper, C&L analyze the impact of gun prevalence on homicides in U.S. counties in 
order to evaluate the social costs associated with private gun ownership. They consider the 
following empirical model: 
( )    (
            
             
)                         (    )             
The left-hand side variable is the number of homicides in county i at time t divided by 
population. C&L’s main variable of interest, FSSi,t-1, is defined as the share of suicides 
committed by firearms out of total number of suicides. It is employed as a proxy for gun 
prevalence. The vector of control variables X contains the prevalence of blacks, robberies, 
burglaries, the share of households headed by females, urban residence, and residents living in 
the same house five years ago, all in logs. Before taking logs, all control variables are divided 
by the respective county’s population at time t. To account for heteroscedasticity, the 
observations are weighted by each county’s population. The point estimate of β1 reported by 
C&L is about 0.09 when the full set of controls is employed and statistically significant at the 
5% level. However, the above empirical specification has several problems. 
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First, caution is required when ratios are used in regression analyses (Pearson, 1896). 
Kronmal (1993) proves that if the dependent variable and the independent variables are 
divided by a common denominator, then least squares estimates are biased. C&L’s empirical 
specification is a special case, which can be seen after transforming Equation (1): 
(  )    (            )     (             )
          (                     )     (             ) 
        (            )     (             )          (             )
    (             )          
Due to the application of logarithms, one of the terms on the left-hand side appears multiple 
times on the right-hand side of the equation as a linear term. Thus, when estimating this 
model by OLS, the coefficient estimates will, at least partially, capture the effect of 
population being explained by itself. 
In defense of C&L’s approach, it could be pointed out that their main variable of interest, FSS, 
is standardized by the number of suicides in a county and not by population, so that their 
conclusions could still be valid even in the presence of a ratio fallacy. This is not a convincing 
argument, however, as (i) any source of endogeneity may affect all estimates (except under 
the empirically irrelevant condition of orthogonality) and (ii) population and the denominator 
of FSS, i.e., the number of suicides, are highly correlated (correlation coefficient from the 
pooled cross-section = 0.91). For these reasons, it is likely that C&L’s estimate of β1 is biased. 
Second, C&L’s empirical specification raises concerns about spurious regressions, which 
arise from the use of nonstationary time series. Although the data cover 20 years and 
deterministic and stochastic trends could be present, C&L do not address this concern. In 
fact—as the authors themselves point out—there is a convergence between high- and low-gun 
ownership areas during the sample period, indicating the existence of county-specific time 
trends (Cook and Ludwig, 2006: 381). Given that there are also heterogeneous trends in 
homicide rates, C&L’s inclusion of county- invariant time fixed effects is not sufficient to rule 
out the potential for spurious regressions. 
 
3. Replication of Cook’s and Ludwig’s Analysis 
We commence our analysis by attempting to replicate C&L’s findings and extract our data 
from the same sources employed by them (see Cook and Ludwig 2004: Appendix 3). 1 
Unfortunately, data on burglaries and robberies, which C&L take from the FBI’s Uniform 
                                                                 
1
 Sociodemographic controls for 1990 are directly taken from the Census Bureau’s 1990 census STF3A and not 
via the ICPSR study dataset 06054 as in C&L. Fo llowing C&L, we exclude the observation from Oklahoma 
County in 1995. 
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Crime Reports, are currently not available for the year 1993. Thus, the number of 
observations decreases when we employ these controls. We estimate Equation (1) with and 
without controls using exactly the same empirical specification as C&L do, i.e., we consider 
only the 200 largest U.S. counties, focus on the period from 1980 to 1999, take logs of all 
variables, include county and time fixed effects, weigh our estimates by each county’s 
population, and report Huber-White standard errors.  
The estimation results of Equation (1) are presented in Table 1. Columns (1a) and (1b) 
contain C&L’s original estimates; the estimates reported in columns (1c) and (1d) are based 
on our own calculations. For whatever reason, we are not able to perfectly replicate C&L’s 
findings.2 However, in most cases, our estimates are reasonably close and the main variable of 
interest is statistically significant across both specifications.3 
 
Table 1: Estimation Results for Equation (1). 
 Estimates by C&L  Own Estimations 
 (1a)   (1b)   (1c)   (1d)  
Main interest variables            
Firearm suicides (t–1) 0.100 
(0.044) 
**  0.086 
(0.038) 
**  0.071 
(0.036) 
**  0.068 
(0.036) 
* 
          
Control variables           
Robberies (t)    0.149 
(0.042) 
***    0.041 
(0.033) 
Burglaries (t)    0.226 
(0.072) 
***    0.143 
(0.056) 
*** 
Blacks (t)    0.278 
(0.164) 
*    0.156 
(0.065) 
** 
Urbanization (t)    –0.537 
(0.157) 
***    –0.432 
(0.243) 
* 
Same house (t)    –0.690 
(0.419) 
   –0.686 
(0.227) 
*** 
Female HH (t)    –0.303 
(0.413) 
   0.741 
(0.175) 
*** 
            
R
2
 0.915   0.923   0.912   0.916  
N 3822   3822   3824  3630 
Notes: Columns (1a) and (1b) contain the orig inal estimates reported in Cook and Ludwig (2006), Tab le 2. 
Estimates in columns (1c) and (1d) are based on our own estimations. Huber-White standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
 
 
                                                                 
2
 Unfortunately, we could not use Cook and Ludwig’s original dataset and Stata codes. In our replication attempt, 
we modified our specification in several ways in order to achieve results matching those reported by C&L. For 
instance, we use population data from d ifferent sources for our analysis and apply different weights (e.g., 
average population, log population). However, our findings do not improve in this regard. 
3
 Note that our sample contains two observations more than does C&L’s. Our findings remain robust if we 
include the years from 2000 to 2004 in our sample and if we employ a balanced panel data set in which all 
counties with at least one missing observation are excluded. 
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4. Addressing Concerns Relating to Ratio Fallacy and Nonstationarity 
In this section, we look at how C&L’s findings are affected if the concerns regarding ratio 
fallacy and nonstationarity outlined in Section 2 are taken seriously. 
To exemplify the problem that arises from using a common (or highly correlated) 
denominator, we estimate a model that is very similar to the one set up in Equation (1): 
( )   (             )          (             )             
The difference between the original C&L specification and Equation (2) is that we omit the 
numerators of the dependent variable and the gun prevalence proxy, i.e., the number of 
homicides and suicides committed by firearms, respectively. The results are presented in 
Model 2 of Table 2.4 The point estimate of β1 is 0.12, i.e., close to C&L’s estimate, and 
significant at every reasonable level of significance. Moreover, model fit, as given by R2, is 
notably higher than in models (1a) and (1c). 5  This result suggests that the significant 
coefficient of C&L’s main variable of interest is primarily driven by the denominators, 
whereas the numerators only add estimation noise. Thus, our findings suggest that C&L’s 
result is based on a ratio fallacy. 
A straightforward way to avoid the problems associated with the use of a highly correlated 
denominator is to refrain from using ratios, as shown in Equation (3): 
( )    (            )           (              )        (      )             
In this specification, it is necessary to control for population size so as to avoid an omitted 
variable bias: the number of homicides and suicides committed by firearms is higher in larger 
counties, which is why both variables will be positively correlated  even if there is no direct 
association between them (see Section 2).6 Note, however, that this specification does not 
eliminate potential stochastic and deterministic trends, which could still lead to a spurious 
regression. The most parsimonious way to address both ratio fallacy and spurious regression 
concerns at the same time is to compute log growth rates: 
( )    (            )            (                     )          
The estimation results for Equations (3) and (4) are presented in the second and third columns 
of Table 2. 
Both modifications of the empirical specification have a large impact on estimates of the gun 
prevalence proxy. There is no longer a statistically significant association between the number 
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 We omitted all controls from the fo llowing specifications to make sure that our estimates are based on the same 
sample as employed by C&L. Note that our findings do not change when the full set of controls is employed. All 
omitted results are available on request. 
5
 This difference in model fit  is even more pronounced if within-R
2
 is considered instead of total R
2
. The within-
R
2
 is only 0.016 for model (1c) compared to 0.214 for model (2).  
6
 Still, our results hardly change when population size is omitted from our specification. 
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of homicides and firearm suicides. The p-values corresponding to the estimates of β1 in 
Models 3 and 4 are 0.50 and 0.52, respectively.7 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results for Equations (2), (3), and (4). 
 (2) 
Log 
Population 
 
(3) 
Log Homicides  
 
(4) 
∆Log Homicides  
Main interest variables         
Firearm suicides (t–1)   0.024 
(0.036) 
 –0.013 
(0.019) 
Suicides (t–1) 0.120 
(0.018) 
***     
      
Control variables       
Population (t)   0.506 
(0.083) 
***   
         
R
2
 0.996   0.974  0.041  
N 3824   3824  3714  
Notes: In model (2), the dependent variable is log(populationt) and the gun prevalence proxy 
is replaced by log(suicidest–1). In model (3), the dependent variable is log(homicidest) and the 
independent variable log(firearm suicidest–1). In model (4), log growth rates are computed. 
Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
 
In an alternative specification, C&L use the share of homicides committed by firearms as the 
dependent variable and again find a significant impact of the gun prevalence proxy. When we 
make this modification to our specification, we, too, replicate our previous results: once the 
ratio fallacy is addressed, no statistically significant positive association can be found.8 In fact, 
in the case of log growth rates, we even find a significantly negative impact of gun prevalence 
on firearm homicides at the 5% level of significance. Thus, we believe that our analysis 
provides substantial evidence that the positive association between homicides and gun 
prevalence is a statistical artifact. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Cook and Ludwig’s (2006) findings on the association between the number of homicides and 
gun prevalence in U.S. counties have not only been widely acknowledged in the scientific 
community, but are also used in policy discussion as an argument for more gun control. We 
suggest that their results are based on a misspecification of the empirical model and subject to 
ratio fallacy and spurious regression. After appropriately adjusting the empirical model to take 
                                                                 
7
 Note that this finding is robust to omitting population from the regression. 
8
 Results available on request. 
8 
these issues into account, we conclude that gun ownership has no significant impact on 
homicides in U.S. counties over the period 1980 to 2004.  
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Abstract
When attempting to measure gun ownership in the United States, the
problem of missing administrative data arises, making it necessary to find a
valid proxy. Several such proxies are employed in economic studies, one of
which is the fraction of “suicides by firearm” of “all suicides” (FSS). My work
validates this proxy from out-of-sample data, namely, Austrian administra-
tive data on firearm licenses. I also reevaluate, with appropriate statistical
methods, a result on firearms and suicide from the medical that is often used
for public policy advocacy. This result is, unfortunately, heavily biased due
to ignoring a well-known fallacy and thus can be only partially confirmed.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introdution
The economic literature contains ample investigation into the relation between
guns and crime. Seeing that in the United States there were 11,078 deadly as-
saults by firearm and 19,392 suicides by firearm in 2010,1 a closer investigation
of a possible association between firearms and suicide seems warranted. Two
studies of Ireland (Kennelly, 2007; Yang and Lester, 2007) – with remarkably
different outcomes – elaborate on the economic dimension of suicide in terms
of cost. Furthermore, firearm suicide as a fraction of all suicides is believed to
be a good proxy, at least in the cross-section, for gun ownership density (Azrael,
Cook and Miller, 2004; Kleck, 2004). This association is exploited by Cook and
Ludwig (2006) in a very detailed, albeit flawed (Westphal, 2013), analysis of the
association between firearms and crime. Lang (2013) analyzes the association
between firearms and suicide using U.S. National Instant Background Check data
and confirms the validity of the FSS proxy.It seems valuable to investigate the in-
teraction between firearms and suicide with high quality data from other than a
U.S. sample, taking care to avoid methodological fallacies.
After World War II, European countries enacted much tighter firearms regu-
lation than what exists in the United States. Therefore, much better administra-
tive data are available. Austria has relatively low restrictions on the acquisition
of firearms but has become increasingly concerned with monitoring legally pur-
chased firearms. Austrian data on concealed carry licenses are available from
1982 to the present for all Austrian counties. This provides a reasonable, albeit
imperfect, nationwide proxy for gun ownership taken directly from administra-
tive data on firearm permits. These data have been used to compute correlations
between firearm ownership rates and suicide rates in the medical literature (Et-
zersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck, 2006), and provide an intriguing starting point
for possibly confirming, or not, the validity of the FSS proxy and at the same time
further investigating the relationship between suicide and firearms.
Two questions are addressed in this paper: (1) Can the FSS proxy for gun
ownership be confirmed from Austrian data on gun licenses? – and (2) What
can be said about the relationship between firearms and suicide in Austria after
a careful review of the methods used for analysis in former work? Answering
these questions results in two main findings. First, I confirm the validity of the
FSS proxy. An association between firearms and firearm suicides is persistent
across all methods of analysis used and a variety of model specifications. If one
prefers clustered standard errors over Driscoll-Kraay standard errors – a prefer-
ence I do not advocate in my setting – a substitution between suicide methods
1ICD-10 codes X93, X94, and X95 used for “assault by firearm”; X72, X73, and X74 for “suicide
by firearm.” Values taken from United States Department of Health and Human Services (2010).
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shows in the main model. Second, it is clear that, earlier correlation results in
Etzersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck (2006) on the association between firearms
and suicides are greatly overstated due to ignoring Pearson’s (1896) finding on
spurious correlations between ratio variables. Thus, the contributions of this pa-
per include validation of earlier approaches to measuring gun ownership,2 and a
warning as to the hazards of using spurious results in public policy debate.
My paper is organised as follows. I revisit the literature on guns and suicide
in Austria in Section 2. In Section 3.1, the results from Etzersdorfer, Kapusta
and Sonneck (2006) are repeated. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 point out the statistical
fallacy in Etzersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck (2006) and adjust for the problem
using two approaches that both lead to numerically very close and qualitatively
identical results. Section 4 motivates and estimates a fixed effects panel model
based on a theoretical model from the economic literature. The main finding for
the FSS proxy is found to be robust to several robustness checks in Section 4.2.
2 Former Analysis of Firearms and Suiides in
Austria
Etzersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck (2006) (EKS hereafter) analyze correlations
between suicide rates and rates of firearm ownership, proxied by the rate of con-
cealed carry licenses, in all nine Austrian counties over the period from 1990 to
2000. Their results from a repeated cross-sectional analysis are strong rank cor-
relations between the firearms measure and firearm suicides, low-to-no rank corre-
lations between firearms and other suicides, and weakly positive rank correlations
between firearms and all suicides. Based on these findings, their conclusion is to
assume that overall suicides increase with more firearms, as depicted in Figure
1(a), as opposed to a substitution between suicide methods as shown in Figure
1(b). In EKS’s (p. 468) opinion their findings “emphasise the need for political
support” for stricter regulation on gun ownership in the interest of preventing
suicide. Their finding is now propagated through the literature; for example, “it
is a scientific fact . . . that reducing the availability of guns . . .will reduce deaths”
(Leenaars, 2006, 439). There many references to similar studies3 can be found.
2This measure is not without problems itself as can be seen in Westphal (2013).
3Notably similar to EKS of thosementioned areMarkush and Bartolucci (1984), Killias (1993)
and Leenaars et al. (2003).
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Figure 1: Competing models
3 Revisiting EKS's Results
3.1 Repliation
In a first step, I replicate the results from EKS. EKS use four variables: population
size (pop), gun carry licenses4 (CCL), suicides with firearms (E955), and all sui-
cides (E95). The latter two are based on their ICD-95 codes of the same name.
The number of carry permits is used as a proxy for the number of gun owners.
I obtained the data from their primary sources. Data on carry permits were ob-
tained from the Austrian Interior Ministry, Department III/3. Statistik Austria
provided population and suicide figures. Data for all variables were provided for
the years t = {1982, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994,1995, . . . , 2011}6 and all
K = 9 Austrian counties k = 1,2, . . . ,K. I.e. popk,t is population size in year t
in county k. An overview of the variables is given in Table 1. These also are the
variable names used in my program code and the data made available with this
paper. Descriptives are set out in EKS (p. 464–465).
EKS compute rank correlations between gun ownership rates and suicide rates.
Table 2 row I sets out my results for Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient as
4“Waffenpaesse.” CCL is the U.S. acronym for “concealed carry license.” A CCL and a “Waf-
fenpass” are not legally exactly identical, but are very similar and so I therefore use the acronym
CCL based on its international recognition value.
5E955 includes suicides by explosives which cannot be distinguished from firearm suicides.
However, for later years ICD-10 codes are available, which do differentiate between firearm and
explosives suicides. The numbers indicate that there are very few suicides by explosives.
6Upon request, I could not be supplied with data for 1991 and 1993. Remarkable, EKS state
results for these years.
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Underlying Absolute Meaning Rate How computed?
Firearms CC L
Number of
CC LR CP/pop
carry permits
Firearm
E955
Number of fire-
FSR E955/pop
suicides arm suicides
All suicides E95
Number of
SR E95/pop
all suicides
Suicides not
NE955
Number of suicides
OSR NE955/pop
with firearms not with firearms
Population pop
Number of
NA NA
inhabitants
Table 1: Variables and their meaning
well as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, averaged over all years t.7 Detailed
result for individual years can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix. Neither small
sample size nor non-normality of data, as claimed by EKS (p. 465), contradict
the computation of Pearson’s correlation coefficient. I therefore included these
values in Table 2: values do not deviate much from the rank correlations. Tables
2 and 4 reveal the numerical and qualitative results from EKS are robust to the
inclusion of years prior to and after their original period as well as to using either
Pearson’s or Spearman’s method.
3.2 Aounting for Spurious Correlation between Ratios
Unfortunately, EKS fail to acknowledge Pearson’s finding on correlations between
ratios (Pearson, 1896): using ratios for correlation analysis may lead to spurious
results.
Table 2, Row I shows there is little difference between rank correlations and
Pearson’s correlation for the data. Because of this and because of the availabil-
ity of a theoretical result from Kim (1999), I now first use Pearson’s correlation
coefficient for illustration and examination of the ratio fallacy problem in EKS’s
results. A simulation study conducted in Section 3.3 shows that my findings do
not change when using rank correlations.
Let there be three independent random variables X ,Y, Z with known expected
values and variances. To illustrate the problem at hand, let Xk,t be the number of
CCLs in county k in year t. Yk,t represents the corresponding number of suicides,
7As opposed to the rank correlation of the average rates over time (what is the meaning of that
value aside from it being larger than the individual correlations in this setting?) as in EKS (Table
2).
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Firearm suicides Other suicides All suicides
Row Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman
I
Correlations between ratios. . .
0.647 0.640 −0.053 0.044 0.157 0.222
IIa
. . . rescaled by estimated reference points
0.459 NA −0.317 NA −0.152 NA
IIb
Reference points estimated by Equation (1)
0.357 NA 0.397 NA 0.394 NA
IIIa
. . . rescaled by simulated reference points
0.433 0.444 −0.302 −0.190 −0.175 −0.089
IIIb
Simulated reference points
0.390 0.364 0.370 0.309 0.429 0.393
Table 2: Correlations between gun ownership rate and suicide rates and rescaling
points. Both averaged over time
firearm suicides, or non-firearm suicides. Zk,t is the county’s population in that
year. In this setting, the coefficient of correlation rX/Z ,Y/Z between X/Z and Y /Z
in year t will not usually be zero, even if all three variables were truly uncorre-
lated. This spurious correlation is driven by the identical denominator common
to both ratios.8 The theoretical reference point for no correlation in this case is
given in Kim (1999, Eq. (2.2)) as
r0
X/Z ,Y/Z
=
V 2
1/Zq
[V 2
X
(1+ V 2
1/Z
) + V 2
1/Z
][V 2
Y
(1+ V 2
1/Z
) + V 2
1/Z
]
(1)
for positive expected values of X ,Y and when VA is the coefficient of variation,
i.e., VA =
p
V (A)/E (A). Positive expectation and finite variance is clearly fulfilled
for population, suicides, and CCLs for all t. Therefore the empirical moments of
population, carry permits and suicides will be used in Equation (1) to estimate
the reference points for each year, as suggested by Kim (1999, 386). Using these
yearly estimates to rescale the correlations based on Equations (2) and (3) gives
us the rescaled correlations shown in Table 2, Row IIa with the estimated rescal-
ing points in Row IIb. Detailed results for individual years are given in Table 5 in
8See Pearson (1896); Kronmal (1993); and Kim (1999).
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the Appendix.
r∗
X/Z ,Y/Z
=
rX/Z ,Y/Z − rˆ
0
X/Z ,Y/Z
1+ rˆ0
X/Z ,Y/Z
∀rX/Z ,Y/Z ≤ r
0
X/Z ,Y/Z
(2)
r∗
X/Z ,Y/Z
=
rX/Z ,Y/Z − rˆ
0
X/Z ,Y/Z
1− rˆ0
X/Z ,Y/Z
∀rX/Z ,Y/Z > r
0
X/Z ,Y/Z
(3)
We obtain an average rescaled correlation of 0.46 between firearms and firearm
suicides. This is neither a very strong nor a very weak correlation. Thus associ-
ation between these two measures appears to persist after rescaling, albeit far
more weakly than stated by EKS. Between firearms and non-firearm suicides, the
average rescaled correlation over time takes a negative value of −0.32, which
is rather weak. What is remarkable is the change in sign compared to the spu-
rious results reported by EKS. Last, for all suicides, there is an average rescaled
correlation of −0.15. This is hard to interpret without testing for significance,
a problem addressed in Section 4. Without testing for significance, we have a
not very strong, but clearly present, positive correlation between the measure for
firearms and firearm suicides, a rather weak negative correlation between the
measure for firearms and other suicides, and a negative correlation between the
measure for firearms and all suicides too weak to base any findings on. However,
it is still clear that rejecting Model (b) of Figure 1 in favor of Model (a), as done
by EKS, is not advisable based on this empirical foundation.
3.3 Simulation Study
The results fromTables 2 (Rows IIa and IIb) and 5while theoretically well founded
are surprising given how much they change the initial results. Also my results
report rescaled correlations for Pearson’s method and not for Spearman’s rank
correlation: ranks are not ratios. So, do the results hold for ranked ratios? Be-
cause I could find no theoretical result for spurious correlation reference points
for ranks of ratios, I conducted a simulation study.
I used a hotdeck simulation. For each year I repeatedly (10,000 times), ran-
domly, and independently redistributed the observed numerators (E95, E955,
CCL) across the counties, thus ensuring that, on average, there is no correlation
between the numerators. Fortunately, max{E95k,t , E955k,t ,CCLk,t}<min{popk,t}
∀t so no ratios > 1 could occur. I next, for each repetition, computed the same
ratios and ranks of ratios as done for the analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The
random rank correlations of the numerators generated in this manner appear to
be distributed around 0. (See Figure 2 in Appendix B for selected years.) The
ratios’ rank correlation distributions, on the other hand, are clearly shifted to
the right and obviously skewed (Appendix B, Figure 3). The situation is persis-
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tent for all years and Pearson’s correlations. The numerical results are well in
accordance with the correction derived from Kim’s (1999) theoretical result and
Pearson’s (1896) initial estimates of the problem size.
Year-wise simulated reference points can be calculated by computing themean
of the simulated (rank) correlations between the ratios. These values then can be
used to rescale the results from the biased correlation analysis from Table 2, Row
I, resulting in Rows IIIa, IIIb, and the detailed Tables 6 and 7 for rank correlations
and Pearson’s correlations found in Appendix B.
Results from Table 2, Row IIIa and Tables 6 and 7 are intriguing: after rescal-
ing there remains, on average, a negative correlation between concealed carry
licenses and all suicides. Interpreting such low correlation coefficients in favor
of any side of any debate, however, is a tricky business. This question of valid
inference is addressed in Section 4 of this paper.
4 Panel Regression
4.1 Model and Results
A more sophisticated method for analyzing the data seems appropriate. Panel
regression, in contrast to EKS’s repeated cross-sectional analysis, is capable of
accounting for the contemporal and intertemporal structure of the data. Panel
regression must be employed carefully as (a) either using ratios or (b) ignoring
time series effects may cause spurious results. (a) can be dealt with by consid-
ering a risk model, as outlined below; (b) is solved by estimating the model on
first differences.
The risk model is theoretically based on Duggan (2003).9 A binary choice
model is set up for individual i’s suicide decision in the form of a linear probability
model:
Pr(Suicidei) = α+ X iθ + γGuni +λi + ǫi. (4)
X i represents individual characteristics, Guni is a dummy indicating if i owns
a firearm, and the individual propensity λi tells us how strongly i is inclined
to commit suicide. As Duggan notes, if the unobservable λi and Guni are not
independent, we face a sample selection problem. Taking Duggan (2003, Eq. 2)
λi = µ+σGuni + ζi (5)
we see that unless σ = 0 in Equation (5), omitting λi introduces a bias into
estimation of Equation (4)’s parameters. This problem can be overcome by using
the data from above and imposing a risk model on the aggregate values. Let the
9I deviate slightly from Duggan’s notation without changing the model to keep my formulas
simple.
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number of suicides (all, firearm, or non-firearm) have a conditional expectation
of
E [Yk,t |X k,t ,Gunk,t ,λk,t , popk,t] = popk,t (α+ X k,tθ + γGunk,t +λk,t) (6)
where X k,t ,λk,t are the averages of those values in county k in year t and Gunk,t
is the percentage of gun owners in k’s population in year t. When we assume the
average propensity and the average characteristics to be invariant over time, the
(averages of) controls in Xk,t and the propensities can be fully captured in a fixed
effect model’s county dummy. For those X i that are individual characteristics,
popX become the count of persons with these characteristics.
Slightly relaxing the restriction of time-invariant unobserved variables, iden-
tical intertemporal changes in X and λ across all Austria can be captured in a
time dummy. Then we arrive at a two-way fixed effects model of
yk,t = β0popk,t + β1CCLk,t + dk + dt + ǫk,t . (7)
Here the number of concealed carry licenses is used as a proxy10 for the number of
gun owners. Then β0 can be interpreted identically to α from Equations (4) and
(6) as the baseline risk of an individual committing suicide. β1 will be related to γ
by the relation between concealed carry licenses and gun owners. A gun owner’s
relative risk of committing suicide from Equation (4), ignoring propensity for
illustrative purposes, will be related to the ratio of coefficients from Equation
(7):
α+ X iθ + γ
α+ X iθ
∼
β0 + β1
β0
. (8)
Given the nature of the data, i.e., a panel with time series, to rule out spuri-
ous results from time series effects (which may be numerous), Equation (7) is
estimated on the first differences,11 i.e.,
∆yk,t = β0∆popk,t + β1∆CCLk,t +δt + νk,t , (9)
which is a common technique for circumventing many time series problems. The
null hypothesis of poolability of the data, conducting a Chow test for poolability
across periods, is rejected for firearm suicides and all suicides as the dependent
variable with p-values12 < 0.05. Results are shown in Table 3. The association
10This will be a somewhat noisy proxy, of course, so we expect coefficient estimates to be
biased downward (Baltagi, 2008, Section 10.1).
11Including individual fixed growth parameters, i.e. a county dummy in the first differenced
model, leads to highly insignificant county fixed effects and to no qualitative change to the results
set out in Tables 3 and 8.
12All standard errors are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998); available for Stata
via xts from Hoechle (2007). Employing clustered robust standard errors does not qualita-
tively change the results and – for all results reported to be significant on any level – uniformly
yields smaller p-values.
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between firearms and firearm suicides, well known from the extant literature,
is confirmed at a reasonable level of significance. No association is found for
firearms and overall suicides. There are three obvious explanations of this result.
(a) Too much noise may be added to the model by including other suicides, so
that significance can no longer be attained.
(b) Variables that cannot be captured by the dummies aremissing from themodel,
somehow causing the coefficient to be biased toward zero.
(c) The negative coefficient for non-firearm suicides shows very weak signifi-
cance:13 using one sided testing, the p-value is 0.08, which may imply sub-
stitution between methods in accordance with the findings of Klieve, Barnes
and De Leo (2009) and Leenaars et al. (2003). Given that the opposed effect
estimates are of nearly identical size, this argument is intriguing. However,
the extremely weak significance of the negative coefficient must be consid-
ered, meaning that this finding should be viewed with caution. It is not
replicated in the alternative model specifications in Section 4.2.14 Repeating
my analysis with more data from different countries would be interesting.
exogenous Dependent variable, differenced
variable all suicides firearm suicides other suicides
∆pop −0.000094 −0.000094 0.0000004
(0.000173) (0.000153) (0.000159)
∆CCL 0.000351 0.003517∗∗∗ −0.0031670†
(0.002080) (0.001317) (0.002235)
R2
within
0.0008 0.0584 0.0097
Table 3: Estimation results for Model (9), standard errors in parentheses,
†/*/**/*** indicating two sided significance on 20/10/5/1% levels, robust stan-
dard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) computed with vovSCC from
Croissant and Millo (2008), N = 198 observations, R2 adjusted
4.2 Robustness
The results from Section 4.1 do not exhibit strong significance, thus raising the
question of their robustness to slight modifications15 of the estimating equation.
One possible modification is to standardise across counties by computing log
13With clustered robust standard errors, the coefficient becomes highly significant.
14All of those model specifications exhibit a worse fit. Thus they will all likely be further off
the true underlying conditional expectation function.
15I use ǫk,t for the error term multiple times in this section; however, I do not assume it to be
identically distributed for all models. I also reuse β for coefficients with different interpretations.
These are not identical across models.
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growth rates on both sides of the estimating equation. This results in
ln
  yk,t
yk,t−1

= α+ β0 ln
  popk,t
popk,t−1

+ β1 ln
  CCLk,t
CCLk,t−1

+ ǫk,t (10)
where once again yk,t may be either the number of all suicides, firearm suicides,
or other suicides. The hypothesis of poolability across periods for Equation (10)
is not rejected for any of the dependent variables. Thus the estimation is run
without time dummies.16 Results are found in Table 8 in the Appendix, in the
row labeled “Log growth rates (pooled).” A moderately significant and positive
estimate for β1 is found when firearm suicides is the dependent variable.
Another feasible model specification is estimation directly on the ratios. Kro-
nmal’s (1993: 390) advice of including the inverse of the common denominator
as an explanatory variable must be taken, however, or this model would fall prey
to the same spuriousness found in EKS’s results. Heterogeneous time trends in
ratios are addressed by taking first differences. The estimating equation becomes
∆yk,t = β0pop
−1
k,t
+ β1∆CCLRk,t +δt + ǫk,t (11)
where ∆yk,t for all suicides is computed as SRk,t − SRk,t−1; for the other sui-
cides, the respective ratios are used. There is no “common denominator” per se
for the left- and right-hand sides. Constructing a common denominator would
result in population from t and t − 1 also appearing in the numerator of both
sides. Therefore, instead of the true denominator, I follow Kronmal’s advice by
assuming population to be constant from t − 1 to t. This allows controlling for
the denominator by using pop−1
t,k
as an additional variable on the right-hand side.
Testing rejects poolability across time, at least for “all suicides”; therefore, the
results given in Table 8 of the Appendix include time fixed effects. Again, the
estimate of Equation (11)’s β1 when firearm suicides are the dependent variable
is positive and moderately significant. The size of the estimate is notably similar
to the result in Table 3 achieved by estimating Equation (9).
Following Duggan (2001) and Cook and Ludwig (2006), who run similar re-
gressions for crime rates, we can also look for elasticity in suicide rates with
respect to gun ownership rates by taking logarithms of the variables:
∆ ln yk,t = α+ β0∆ ln popk,t + β1∆ lnCCLRk,t + ǫk,t. (12)
This model, in contrast to the models used by Duggan (2001) and Cook and Lud-
wig (2006), does account for spurious correlations between ratios by including
the common denominator on the right-hand side. Note that this specification is
16Including time dummies does not change the results qualitatively; significance on the gun
measure weakens, as is to be expected for an overspecified model.
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very similar to Equation (10) model-wise, and as was the case for Equation (10),
here, again, poolability is not rejected. Results for “firearm suicides” and “other
suicides” in Table 8 in the Appendix are also very similar between these two
models.17 The estimate for β1 when firearm suicides is the dependent variable is
positive and moderately significant once again.
Thus, the results from the initial model in Section 4.1 hold up quite well
to several modifications, which is what we would expect given an underlying –
but, of course, unknown – conditional expectation function monotonous in the
variables. From a goodness-of-fit point of view, Model (9) seems to be the best
choice.
In light of this interesting result, a qualitative argument for causality can be
made. Austrian firearm laws allow the purchase of firearms without need for a
CCL. Therefore, persons intending to commit suicide by firearm do not need to
acquire a CCL. This means the number of CCLs should not be driven by the num-
ber of firearm suicides. Firearm suicides, however, may very well be driven by
the number of CCLs, given that those represent an underlying number of firearms
owned by individuals.
5 Conlusion
I conclude this paper with two main findings.
(1) The “Fraction of Suicides by Firearms” (FSS) does indeed appear to be a valid
proxy for gun ownership density. My results are in accordance with recent
findings from U.S. data (Lang, 2013).18
(2) The correlation results from Etzersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck (2006) are
greatly overstated because the authors fail to acknowledge spurious correla-
tions between ratios.
Note, however, that finding (1), does not mean FSS should be used indiscrimi-
nately in regression analysis of models that contain firearms as an explanatory
variable. FSS has its own problems, detailed in Westphal (2013), and may pro-
duce spurious results itself.
Finding (2) indicates that EKS’s results cannot be used for public policy ad-
vocacy. Given that the journal that published Etzersdorfer, Kapusta and Sonneck
(2006) is unwilling to acknowledge the partial spuriousness of the results,19 EKS’s
article should be viewed with caution by the scientific and political community.
17An explanation for this can be found in Westphal (2013, Section 5.2).
18Lang’s results are not affected by the ratio fallacy. The author unhesitatingly shared his data
with me; running the usual specifications to check for spurious results due to ratio variables did
not lead to different findings.
19The Wiener Klinische Wochenschrift rejected a short note on this problem for reasons unre-
lated to the scientific finding.
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In conclusion, this paper demonstrates once again20 that correlation and re-
gression studies involving ratios need to take a close and careful look at the nature
of the data and their possible implications. Recently, the ratio fallacy was demon-
strated to occur in a prominent study on the association between guns and crime
(Westphal, 2013), and it very well may be a problem in more analyses on that
topic.
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A Correlation Tables, Repeated Cross-Setion
Rates
Firearm Other All
suicides suicides suicides
Year Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman
1982 0.265 0.25 0.375 0.317 0.363 0.317
1985 0.734 0.667 0.131 0.233 0.331 0.200
1987 0.568 0.617 0.507 0.400 0.622 0.533
1990 0.870 0.867 0.014 −0.083 0.345 0.300
1992 0.658 0.517 0.006 0.200 0.209 0.183
1994 0.756 0.733 −0.111 0.083 0.144 0.283
1995 0.651 0.700 −0.038 −0.117 0.235 0.267
1996 0.381 0.300 −0.118 −0.067 0.044 0.200
1997 0.768 0.617 −0.181 −0.033 0.144 0.250
1998 0.512 0.417 0.215 0.300 0.353 0.400
1999 0.762 0.867 0.090 0.183 0.421 0.567
2000 0.745 0.817 −0.072 −0.083 0.155 0.250
2001 0.643 0.667 0.184 0.500 0.358 0.717
2002 0.527 0.583 0.049 0.167 0.196 0.133
2003 0.727 0.667 −0.156 −0.333 0.086 −0.267
2004 0.816 0.983 −0.152 −0.083 0.046 0.250
2005 0.213 0.367 −0.513 −0.383 −0.410 −0.267
2006 0.669 0.733 0.003 0.233 0.203 0.283
2007 0.463 0.300 −0.619 −0.400 −0.549 −0.317
2008 0.817 0.767 0.231 0.417 0.586 0.583
2009 0.767 0.700 −0.298 −0.200 −0.072 −0.033
2010 0.856 0.850 −0.252 −0.317 0.086 0.100
2011 0.712 0.733 −0.521 0.083 −0.296 0.167
Average
over time 0.647 0.640 −0.053 0.044 0.157 0.222
Table 4: Correlations between gun ownership rate and suicide rates
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firearms suicides other suicides all suicides
estimated rescaled estimated rescaled estimated rescaled
Year r0 r∗ r0 r∗ r0 r∗
1982 0.366 −0.074 0.378 −0.002 0.377 −0.010
1985 0.380 0.571 0.390 −0.186 0.391 −0.043
1987 0.358 0.327 0.378 0.207 0.377 0.393
1990 0.357 0.797 0.399 −0.275 0.392 −0.034
1992 0.364 0.462 0.388 −0.275 0.387 −0.128
1994 0.359 0.619 0.387 −0.359 0.384 −0.173
1995 0.353 0.460 0.404 −0.315 0.396 −0.115
1996 0.336 0.068 0.392 −0.366 0.383 −0.245
1997 0.375 0.629 0.393 −0.412 0.391 −0.177
1998 0.324 0.278 0.394 −0.128 0.382 −0.021
1999 0.338 0.641 0.401 −0.222 0.393 0.047
2000 0.384 0.586 0.414 −0.344 0.414 −0.183
2001 0.364 0.439 0.418 −0.165 0.412 −0.038
2002 0.383 0.234 0.394 −0.247 0.399 −0.145
2003 0.403 0.543 0.393 −0.394 0.396 −0.222
2004 0.391 0.698 0.407 −0.397 0.408 −0.257
2005 0.333 −0.090 0.412 −0.655 0.399 −0.578
2006 0.344 0.495 0.400 −0.284 0.391 −0.135
2007 0.359 0.163 0.402 −0.729 0.403 −0.678
2008 0.331 0.726 0.410 −0.127 0.406 0.303
2009 0.366 0.633 0.392 −0.496 0.395 −0.334
2010 0.340 0.782 0.420 −0.473 0.412 −0.231
2011 0.324 0.575 0.372 −0.651 0.367 −0.485
Average
over time 0.357 0.459 0.397 −0.317 0.394 −0.152
Table 5: Correlations rescaled (r∗) with reference points of no correlation (r0)
between carry permit rates and suicide rates; reference points estimated by Equa-
tion (1)
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B Simulation Results
Rank correlations between suicides and CCLs
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Figure 2: Histograms of simulated rank correlations between uncorrelated carry
permits and suicides.
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Rank correlations between suicide ratios and CCLs per capita
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Figure 3: Histograms of simulated rank correlations between uncorrelated carry
permits and suicide rates.
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firearms suicides other suicides all suicides
simulated rescaled simulated rescaled simulated rescaled
year t r0 rg r∗ r0 rg r∗ r0 rg r∗
1982 0.346 −0.072 0.277 0.055 0.362 −0.033
1985 0.398 0.447 0.321 −0.066 0.399 −0.142
1987 0.376 0.386 0.291 0.154 0.369 0.260
1990 0.342 0.797 0.295 −0.292 0.389 −0.064
1992 0.380 0.220 0.297 −0.075 0.382 −0.144
1994 0.343 0.594 0.278 −0.152 0.358 −0.055
1995 0.339 0.546 0.300 −0.320 0.397 −0.093
1996 0.313 −0.010 0.277 −0.269 0.358 −0.116
1997 0.343 0.417 0.280 −0.245 0.368 −0.087
1998 0.298 0.169 0.285 0.021 0.362 0.060
1999 0.322 0.803 0.302 −0.091 0.388 0.292
2000 0.406 0.691 0.335 −0.314 0.417 −0.118
2001 0.409 0.436 0.339 0.244 0.433 0.501
2002 0.432 0.266 0.316 −0.113 0.396 −0.188
2003 0.419 0.426 0.328 −0.498 0.414 −0.481
2004 0.416 0.971 0.330 −0.311 0.405 −0.110
2005 0.300 0.095 0.314 −0.531 0.391 −0.473
2006 0.329 0.603 0.299 −0.051 0.385 −0.074
2007 0.393 −0.067 0.331 −0.549 0.405 −0.514
2008 0.375 0.627 0.367 0.078 0.457 0.232
2009 0.418 0.484 0.327 −0.397 0.414 −0.316
2010 0.368 0.763 0.345 −0.492 0.441 −0.236
2011 0.317 0.609 0.277 −0.152 0.358 −0.141
average
over time 0.364 0.444 0.309 −0.190 0.393 −0.089
Table 6: Rank correlations rescaled (rg r∗) with simulated reference points of no
correlation (r0) between carry permit rates and suicide rates
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firearms suicides other suicides all suicides
simulated rescaled simulated rescaled simulated rescaled
Year r0 r∗ r0 r∗ r0 r∗
1982 0.383 −0.086 0.342 0.050 0.392 −0.021
1985 0.408 0.551 0.367 −0.173 0.417 −0.061
1987 0.383 0.299 0.356 0.235 0.406 0.364
1990 0.374 0.792 0.358 −0.254 0.420 −0.053
1992 0.402 0.427 0.355 −0.258 0.416 −0.146
1994 0.381 0.605 0.347 −0.340 0.409 −0.188
1995 0.377 0.439 0.364 −0.295 0.431 −0.137
1996 0.359 0.034 0.349 −0.346 0.417 −0.263
1997 0.403 0.611 0.359 −0.397 0.426 −0.198
1998 0.340 0.260 0.356 −0.104 0.422 −0.048
1999 0.373 0.620 0.363 −0.200 0.428 −0.004
2000 0.439 0.546 0.399 −0.337 0.458 −0.208
2001 0.412 0.393 0.398 −0.153 0.460 −0.070
2002 0.436 0.163 0.383 −0.242 0.439 −0.169
2003 0.442 0.512 0.385 −0.390 0.439 −0.245
2004 0.429 0.678 0.393 −0.391 0.445 −0.276
2005 0.353 −0.103 0.375 −0.646 0.435 −0.588
2006 0.368 0.476 0.368 −0.266 0.432 −0.160
2007 0.409 0.092 0.390 −0.726 0.443 −0.678
2008 0.368 0.710 0.401 −0.121 0.456 0.240
2009 0.410 0.605 0.383 −0.493 0.439 −0.355
2010 0.378 0.769 0.393 −0.463 0.456 −0.254
2011 0.346 0.560 0.337 −0.642 0.394 −0.495
average
over time 0.390 0.433 0.370 −0.302 0.429 −0.175
Table 7: Correlations rescaled (r∗) with simulated reference points of no corre-
lation (r0) between carry permit rates and suicide rates
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C Further Regression Analysis Results
The results for the different models need to be viewed with caution. Joint signif-
icance is weak to nonexistent for all of them. The value of reporting the results
lies in the robustness of the positive coefficient on the various transformations of
the firearms proxy.
The time-pooled models are estimated with a constant as shown in Equations
(10) and (12). In theory, this constant should be zero. However, for some of
the pooled models, this constant tests weakly significant. This could indicate an
ignored time effect, thereby contradicting the result from the respective Chow
tests for timepoolability. Results for these models do not differ much when they
are estimated without time pooling.
exogenous Dependent variable
variable all suicides firearm suicides other suicides
Log growth rates (pooled), Equation (10)
ln(popt/popt−1) 0.1442 −2.2778
† 0.5507
(0.590) (1.572) (0.633)
ln(CCLt/CCLt−1) −0.0044 0.7981
∗∗
−0.1516
(0.209) (0.312) (0.178)
R2
pooled
0.0000 0.01411 0.0024
Estimation on ratios, Equation (11)
pop−1 0.4916 0.1870 0.3046
(2.001) (0.744) (1.483)
∆CCLR 0.0038† 0.0030∗∗ 0.0008
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
R2
within
0.0078 0.0254 0.0006
Elasticity estimation (pooled), Equation (12)
∆ ln pop −0.8602† −2.4800∗ −0.6009
(0.620) (1.427) (0.633)
∆ lnCCLR −0.0044 0.7981∗∗ −0.1516
(0.148) (0.312) (0.178)
R2
pooled
0.0015 0.0152 0.0121
Table 8: Estimation results for panel models, standard errors in parentheses,
†/*/**/*** indicating two sided significance on 20/10/5/1% levels, robust stan-
dard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) computed with vovSCC from
Croissant and Millo (2008), N = 198 observations, R2 adjusted
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